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Brandjacking on Social Networks:
Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of
Markholders
LISA P. RAMSEY†
INTRODUCTION
Many companies and organizations today are using
social network sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and
MySpace to communicate with the public about their goods,
services, and activities.1 Examples include Southwest
Airlines, Comcast, Taco Bell, Billabong, and my own law
school.2 Trademark holders often set up a social network
† Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. For their helpful
comments, I would like to thank Mark Bartholomew, Barton Beebe, Eric
Goldman, Robert Gomulkiewicz, James Grimmelmann, Leah Chan Grinvald,
Laura Heymann, Mary LaFrance, Mark Lemley, Ted Sichelman, David Simon,
Rebecca Tushnet, Peter Yu; the participants at the Boston Intellectual Property
Colloquium at Boston College Law School, the Advertising and the Law
Conference at the University at Buffalo Law School, the Ninth Annual
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, The Age of Digital Convergence: An East-West Dialogue on Law, Media
and Technology Conference at the University of Hong Kong, the IP Innovations
in Science and Technology Seminar at the University of Washington School of
Law; and the students in my 2010 Intellectual Property Seminar. I am also
grateful to Rachel Felong, Zena Hindiyeh, Rachel Johnson, and Cezario
Tebcherani for their excellent research assistance and to the University of San
Diego School of Law for its generous research support.
1. See Verne Kopytoff, Twitter Brainstorming for Plan to Turn Profit, J.
GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 2009, available at http://www.journalgazette.net/
article/20090216/BIZ/302169952/-1/BIZ09; Julian Lee, Squatters Creating
Twittering Confusion, AGE, Apr. 30, 2009, at B2, available at 2009 WLNR
8073054; Brian Stelter, Griping Online? Cable Company Hears You and Talks
Right Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A1. For example, “US retail chain
Wal-Mart recently tweeted: ‘Walmart.com Spalding NBA 52’ Steel Framed
Portable Basketball System $398.00.” Lee, supra.
2. Southwest Airlines on Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/Southwest
(last
visited
June
10,
2010);
Comcast
Cares
on
Twitter,
http://twitter.com/comcastcares (last visited June 10, 2010); Taco Bell Truck on
Twitter, http://twitter.com/tacobelltruck (last visited June 10, 2010); Billabong
Girls on MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/billabonggirls (last visited June 10,
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site account with a publicly-available “page” or “profile” and
use their brand name or other trademarked terms in their
username to identify themselves on these sites.3
Yet markholders are not the only ones who have
registered usernames containing trademarks on social
network sites. Some people have engaged in “username
squatting” and have registered usernames containing
another’s mark with the intent to sell the username to the
markholder for a profit. For example, Coca-Cola and Nike
were allegedly “victims of squatters of their Twitter
identities.”4 There were also many reports of “facesquatting”
on Facebook once it allowed registration of usernames
during the summer of 2009.5
Several individuals have also set up unauthorized social
network site pages for brands on Facebook, Twitter,
MySpace, and other sites.6 Some, like the Coca-Cola fan
page on Facebook, are allowed to exist and are embraced (or
at least tolerated) by markholders who recognize the
benefits of this user-generated content.7 Other accounts are
2010). My law school’s Facebook page is at University of San Diego School of
Law on Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/usdlaw (last visited June 10, 2010).
3. For more details about how brands use social network sites, see infra
Part I.
4. Lee, supra note 1, at B2; see also Charlotte McEleny, Brand Identities at
Risk as Fakers Take Their Place on Twitter, NEW MEDIA AGE, Mar. 12, 2009, at
B2, available at 2009 WLNR 8073054.
5. Posting of Lillian Edwards to PanGloss, Brandjacking and
FaceSquatting,
http://blogscript.blogspot.com/2009/06/brandjacking-and-face
squatting.html (June 16, 2009, 2:42); Posting of Nick O’Neill to All Facebook,
Facesquatting and the 2009 Facebook Username Landrush Aftermath,
http://www.allfacebook.com/2009/06/facesquatting-facebook-usernames/# (June
15, 2009, 12:53); see also Brad Stone, Keeping a True Identity Becomes a Battle
Online, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at B1; Steven Swinford & Chris Gourlay,
Facebookers Snap Up Names, AUSTL., June 15, 2009, at 10, available at 2009
WLNR 11400217.
6. McEleny, supra note 4.
7. As explained in a video posted on Facebook, Dusty Sorg and Michael
Jedrzejewski created a Facebook fan page for Coca-Cola without first obtaining
authorization from Coca-Cola. Videos Posted by Coca-Cola: We Made a Facebook
Page, http://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=57458127013 (last visited
June 10, 2010). Today the page is maintained in partnership with The CocaCola Company. Coca-Cola on Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/cocacola (last
visited June 10, 2010).
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investigated, and shut down or taken over, once their
existence is discovered. For example, “Janet” registered
ExxonMobilCorp on Twitter and used the account to answer
questions about the direction of the company and where it
was spending philanthropy resources.8 It is unclear whether
this person was an Exxon employee.9 Regardless, Exxon’s
official spokesperson said Janet’s Twitter posts were
unauthorized and contained several errors.10 Later, the
account username was changed to Not_EMC.11
Some fake social network site pages become the subject
of lawsuits for trademark infringement, dilution, and other
violations of federal and state laws. An example is the fake
Nine West—Model Auditions group page on Facebook
created by a user with the alias Nine West Shoes that
solicited females interested in model auditions to send
photographs of their faces, bodies, and toes with their
contact information.12 According to Nine West’s Complaint,
8. See Posting of Jeremiah Owyang to Web Strategy, How “Janet” Fooled the
Twittersphere (and Me) She’s the Voice of Exxon Mobil, http://www.webstrategist.com/blog/2008/08/01/how-janet-fooled-the-twittersphere-shes-thevoice-of-exxon-mobil/ (Aug. 1, 2008, 13:15) [hereinafter Owyang, How “Janet”
Fooled the Twittersphere]; Posting of Jeremiah Owyang to Web Strategy, When
Brands Under Fire Step into the Fracas: Exxon Joins Twitter, http://www.webstrategist.com/blog/2008/07/29/when-brands-under-fire-step-into-the-fracasexxon-joins-twitter/ (July 29, 2008, 3:35).
9. Compare Posting of Jeff Trexler to Uncivilsociety.org, Is the Exxon Mobil
Twitterer a Fake?, http://uncivilsociety.org/2008/08/is-the-exxon-mobil-twitterert.html (Aug. 2, 2008, 22:04) (suggesting that Janet may be an employee), and
Posting to Grey Review, “I am an Employee of Exxon Mobil,” Said Janet,
http://www.greyreview.com/2008/08/08/exxon-mobil-janet/ (Aug. 8, 2008, 22:00)
(showing screenshot of post by Janet), with Posting of Ted McKenna to The
Cycle,
Exxon
Requests
Control
of
Fake
Twitter
Account,
http://www.prweekus.com/exxon-requests-control-of-fake-twitter-account/article/
152700/ (Aug. 13, 2008) (noting that the company says Janet is not an
employee).
10. Tom Fowler, ‘Exxon’ on Twitter? Not so, Company Says, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Aug. 2, 2008, at D1; Posting of Shel Holtz to A Shel of My Former Self,
ExxonMobil
Situation
Shows
“Brandjacking”
is
for
Real,
http://blog.holtz.com/index.php/exxonmobil_situation_shows_brandjacking_is_fo
r_real/ (Aug. 1, 2008, 13:11); Owyang, How “Janet” Fooled the Twittersphere,
supra note 8.
note
9;
Not_EMC
11. Grey
Review,
supra
http://twitter.com/Not_EMC (last visited June 10, 2010).

on

Twitter,

12. Complaint at 7-9, ¶¶ 15-18, Nine West Dev. Corp. v. Does 1-10, No. 07-cv7533
(S.D.N.Y.
filed
Aug.
24,
2007),
available
at
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at least 400 Facebook members joined the Nine West—
Model Auditions group and possibly sent personal
information and photographs to an imposter.13 Another
example is the Twitter account set up with the username
TannerFriedman that sent out embarrassing posts—called
“tweets” on Twitter—that purported to be from the public
relations firm Tanner Friedman.14 Upon discovering the
existence of this fake account, Tanner Friedman filed suit.
According to news reports, the fake account may have been
set up by an employee working for a competitor.15
Such unauthorized uses of trademarks may frustrate
markholders, but it is unclear whether trademark
infringement law applies where the mark is not being used
to advertise or sell goods or services.16 Markholders will
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/Cases/cic/3/ninewest.pdf [hereinafter Nine West
Complaint]; Posting of Susan Scafidi to Counterfeit Chic, Couture in Court 3,
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/2007/09/couture_in_court_3.php (Sept. 17, 2007,
20:51) (linking to a copy of the Complaint with the comment “Foot fetish:
Facebook creeps lure ‘models’ by pretending to be Nine West”); Posting of
Rebecca Tushnet to Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)log, Facebook Fraud,
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2007/12/facebook-fraud.html (Dec. 20, 2007, 13:21)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Facebook Fraud].
13. Nine West Complaint, supra note 12, at 9, ¶ 20. After the fake account
was removed from Facebook, another fake Nine West—Model Auditions group
page appeared on Facebook. This one targeted women as young as 13 years of
age, and 226 members joined the group before the site was shut down. Id. at 1213, ¶¶ 32-35.
14. Complaint at 5, ¶¶ 14-17, TFSC, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:09-cv-12017 (E.D.
Mich. filed May 27, 2009), available at 2009 WL 3227408 [hereinafter Tanner
Friedman Complaint]; Tanner Friedman Sues over False Twitter Account, WWJ
NEWSRADIO 950, June 2, 2009, http://www.wwj.com/Tanner-Friedman-SuesOver-False-Twitter-Account/4519407 [hereinafter False Twitter Account].
15. Tanner Friedman Wins Back Control of Twitter Account, WWJ
NEWSRADIO 950, June 24, 2009, http://www.wwj.com/Tanner-Friedman-WinsBack-Control-Of-Twitter-Accou/4668160; see also Posting of Andrew Moshirnia
to Citizen Media Law Project, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Twitter,
Malicious
Ghostwriting,
and
Corporate
Sabotage,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/brandjacking-social-networks-twittermalicious-ghost-writing-and-corporate-sabotage (July 15, 2009, 13:10).
16. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1 (“[U]nless an interloper is using the brand
name to masquerade as that brand and possibly even sell products that are
trading on that name, brand owners are relatively powerless.”) (interview of
Australian attorney Frances Drummond); Tushnet, Facebook Fraud, supra note
12 (“The obvious problem is whether any of these causes of action can apply if
the deceptive Does were operating only for their own perverted gratification,
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likely argue these third parties are engaged in
“brandjacking,” or the “illegal use of trademarked brand
names online.”17 Infringement law prohibits use of another’s
mark that is likely to cause confusion,18 and consumers may
be confused regarding the source of expression posted on a
social network site by an individual who signed up with a
username or account name that incorporates another’s
trademark. Accused infringers will likely contend their use
of the mark is not actionable under trademark doctrine and
is protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.19
This Article explores how current federal trademark
infringement and free speech law applies to alleged
brandjacking on social networks. To focus the discussion,
this Article only considers infringement law, and not
trademark dilution or other federal or state laws.20 After
discussing in Part I how individuals and brands use social
network sites, Part II analyzes whether markholders will be
able to satisfy the elements of a federal trademark
infringement claim when their marks are used without
authorization on these sites. The markholder must prove its
rather than for commercial purposes. I’m willing to accept that pretending to
offer services in the ordinary market—here, the market for modeling services—
ought to count under these (hopefully unique) facts. But bad conduct makes bad
law; using Nine West’s name in a noncommercial context should not, as a rule,
subject the user to the risk of trademark etc. liability. And that’s so even if the
noncommercial context is highly objectionable—e.g., the L.L. Bean sex catalog
case.”).
17. See, e.g., Shaun Waterman, Brand-jacking Rises as Top Online Abuse,
WASH.
TIMES,
Mar.
9,
2009,
available
at
http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/09/brand-jacking-rises-as-top-onlineabuse/; see also Tim Lynch, The Art of Self Defense Against Brand-jacking,
IMEDIA
CONNECTION,
Nov.
12,
2008,
http://www.imediaconnection.
com/content/21110.asp.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Federal trademark dilution law only applies if the plaintiff’s mark is
famous, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006), and does not apply to certain fair uses of
the mark, news reporting and news commentary, and noncommercial use of a
mark. Id. § 1125(c)(3). A markholder may also claim the unauthorized use of its
mark on a social network site violates laws prohibiting defamation, deceptive
trade practices, false advertising, unfair competition, or intentional interference
with contractual or business relations, among other federal or state laws.
Whether these are viable claims is beyond the scope of this Article.
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distinctive mark is used “in commerce” and in connection
with goods, services, or commercial activities.21 Courts in
some circuits will also require evidence of commercial use
and/or trademark use of the mark for a prima facie
trademark infringement claim.22 If these threshold
requirements are met, the court must then determine if the
third party’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion.23
Some courts may conclude that social network site pages
are akin to artistic or literary works and refuse to find
infringement unless this use of the mark explicitly misleads
as to the source or the content of the expression.24
If the accused infringer is using the mark to
impersonate the markholder and cause confusion about the
source of expression on the social network site, some courts
may find infringement even where the third party is not
advertising or selling goods or services.25 The risk of
“impersonation is extremely high” on those sites where “the
username becomes the identity of the poster.”26
Impersonation of markholders is not unique to social
network sites—it also takes place on informational websites
and in the brick-and-mortar world.27 Yet due to the “real
name” culture of certain social network sites like Facebook
and Twitter, users may be more likely to believe false
statements of identity and authorship, and rely to their
detriment on the imposter’s expression.28 The markholder’s
reputation may be harmed by the third party’s disclosure of
untruthful information, or posts that are offensive or
inappropriate. As noted by one commentator with regard to
Janet’s tweets from the ExxonMobilCorp account: “when
someone raised the Exxon Valdez issue, Janet noted that,
while tragic, the Valdez spill didn’t rank among the top 10
such incidents. Clearly, Janet has had no communication
21. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
22. See infra Part II.A.3-4.
23. See infra Part II.A.5.a.
24. See infra Part II.A.5.b.
25. See infra Part II.A.5.c.
26. Posting of Elisa Cooper to MarkMonitor Blog, Protecting Online Identities
in the World of Web 2.0, http://www.markmonitor.com/mmblog/?p=58 (Feb. 12,
2009, 12:19).
27. See infra Part II.A.5.c.
28. See infra Part I.
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training, since that response would provoke anger and
hostility.”29
To address the concerns of individuals and entities who
are the subject of fake accounts, some social network sites
prohibit impersonation of others and the unlawful use of
trademarks on these sites.30 Sites that implement noticeand-takedown procedures may consider banning all
unauthorized uses of trademarks to avoid potential
contributory liability under trademark law.31 (An analysis of
whether the sites are liable in these circumstances is
beyond the scope of this Article; this Article assumes that
social network sites may be liable for contributory
trademark infringement if they do not remove infringing
uses of marks after notice of specific instances of
infringement.) If these sites require authorization for every
use of another’s mark, however, this approach could
seriously harm the free flow of information and ideas on
social network sites. A third party may have a legitimate
reason for using another’s trademark on the site. That
trademarked term may be the person’s first or last name, or
the third party may have concurrent trademark rights, a
fair use defense, or a free speech interest in using the term
29. Holtz, supra note 10.
30. See infra Part I.
31. Per the Supreme Court in Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S.
844 (1982), “if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the
manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a
result of the deceit.” Id. at 854. Lower courts have applied the Inwood test to
Internet service providers if they exercise sufficient control over the infringing
conduct. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980,
984 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Inwood test for contributory trademark
infringement applies to Internet service providers that exercise “[d]irect control
and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the
plaintiff’s mark”); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 2d 1098, 1111-12 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying Akanoc’s motion for summary
judgment on the contributory trademark infringement claim where Akanoc
hosted websites that sold counterfeit products and routed Internet traffic to and
from those websites); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104-10
(2d Cir. 2010) (assuming that the Inwood test applies without deciding the issue
and finding no contributory trademark infringement in a dispute involving the
sale of counterfeit products by third parties on the online auction site eBay); 4 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 25:17-25 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing contributory infringement law).
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in parody, satire, criticism, comparative advertising, news
reporting, or other commentary.32 Not all unauthorized uses
of marks are illegal, and Congress and the courts have
limited trademark rights in certain ways to protect free
speech interests.33
Some accused infringers may argue they have a free
speech right to use another’s mark to impersonate the
markholder on a social network site and communicate
information or ideas purporting to come from the
markholder. It is unlikely that courts will construe the
scope of the right to freedom of expression to be this broad
today. The First Amendment protects anonymous and
pseudonymous expression, but does not protect knowingly
false statements of fact.34 If reasonable members of the
public believe the false statements of identity and
authorship of expression on a social network site, the First
Amendment may not provide a defense for third parties who
use trademarks to falsely state that the markholder is the
author of the imposter’s expression.
In Part III, this Article argues that courts and social
network sites should consider both trademark and free
speech interests in disputes involving the unauthorized use
of marks on these sites. More markholders today are
disseminating information, entertainment, and advertising
to consumers via social network sites, and they often use
their mark in the username, account name, and content of
32. See infra Part II.A.6 & II.B. For an analysis of how current U.S. federal
trademark law may violate the First Amendment and a discussion of the types
of unauthorized uses of marks that are protected by the First Amendment, see
Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61
SMU L. REV. 381, 404-47 (2008) [hereinafter Ramsey, Increasing Scrutiny]. For
a discussion of whether international trademark law permits the United States
to revise its domestic trademark law to make it more speech-protective, see
generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect
Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405 (2010).
33. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, First Amendment Limitations on
Trademark Rights, in 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 147 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007)
[hereinafter Ramsey, First Amendment Limitations] (explaining how Congress
and the courts have protected free speech interests in trademark law, such as by
requiring marks to be distinctive for trademark protection, limiting the scope of
trademark rights, and allowing certain defenses to trademark claims).
34. See infra Part II.B.
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the site to indicate authorship of that expression.35 If third
parties are allowed to use another’s mark in the same way
to impersonate the markholder, this may confuse social
network site users about the source of the imposter’s
expression and increase consumer search costs by making it
more difficult for people to use trademarks to quickly
identify the author of the expression. Yet the free flow of
information and ideas could also be harmed if courts and
social network sites prohibit expressive uses of trademarks
where the third party is not advertising or selling goods or
services, the expression is noncommercial, and/or the third
party is not using the mark to designate the source of goods,
services, or expression on the site.
To balance trademark and free speech interests, this
Article proposes that infringement law should apply to the
unauthorized use of a mark on a social network site that is
likely to cause confusion about the source of expression
unrelated to the advertising or sale of goods or services, but
only where (1) the mark is used to impersonate the
markholder and falsely suggest the markholder is the
author of the third party’s expression, (2) reasonable people
believe the imposter’s false statements of identity and
authorship, and (3) the content of the social network site
page does not dispel the confusion regarding the source of
the expression. If the third party is not advertising or
selling any goods or services on the social network site and
consumers are only confused about whether the markholder
authorized this use of its mark or is affiliated with or
sponsors the third party’s expression, this expressive use of
the mark should be outside of the scope of the trademark
infringement laws.
The focus of the infringement analysis should not be on
whether the markholder consented to this use of its mark or
whether the third party is free riding on the goodwill in the
mark, but rather on whether the third party is using the
mark to falsely indicate that the markholder is the source or
author of the imposter’s expression. Unless the third party
is using the mark in a confusing way to impersonate the
35. Cf. Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship,
Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379, 1398,
1406-09 (2005) [hereinafter Heymann, Birth of the Authornym] (noting marks
are used in screen names or usernames in online communications as statements
of corporate authorship).
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markholder, trademark law will stifle much valuable
expression if infringement is found in cases where the third
party is simply using the mark in parody, satire, criticism,
comparative advertising, news reporting, or other
commentary. Courts and social network sites should
narrowly construe the scope of trademark infringement law
in such circumstances. Unauthorized use of a trademark is
not equivalent to brandjacking.
I. SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AND THE BRANDS THAT USE THEM
Social network sites are “web-based services that allow
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and
traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.”36 Users of these sites can add
information about themselves, photographs, and other
content to personalize their pages or profiles (hereinafter
“pages” or “page”). Each unique page of a social network site
can usually be accessed through a Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) that includes the domain name for that site
followed by the file name for the specific page on that site
(e.g., facebook.com/southwest).37 Some social network sites
36. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., 210, 211 (2008). Early
social network sites include Classmates.com (founded in 1995), Six Degrees of
Separation (1997), and LiveJournal (1999). Next came Friendster (2002),
LinkedIn (2003), MySpace (2003), Orkut (2004), Facebook (for Harvard students
only, 2004), Yahoo! 360 (2005), YouTube (2005), Facebook (for high school
networks, 2005), Facebook (for corporate networks, early 2006), Twitter (2006),
and Facebook (for everyone, late 2006). Id. at 212-13. For more information
about social network sites, see generally id.; James Grimmelmann, Saving
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009) (discussing how Facebook users socialize
and misunderstand the privacy risks associated with their disclosure of
information on Facebook); William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and
Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105 (2009) (providing an
analysis of the potential concerns with “social marketing” on social network
sites and various legal responses to these problems); Lori E. Lesser, Social
Networks and Blogs (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.,
Course Handbook Series No. 962, 2009), available at WL, 962 PLI/Pat 23.
Facebook,
Usernames:
General
Information,
37. E.g.,
http://www.facebook.com/help.php?page=897 (last visited June 10, 2010). This
file name may contain numbers identifying the file (the method used by
Facebook prior to June 2009), or it may contain words or other content
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require users to input a username, account name, profile
name, or other alias that is publicly displayed to other users
in the content of the site and identifies the author of content
posted by that user.38
What makes social network sites unique is that “they
enable users to articulate and make visible their social
networks” and identify “friends,” “contacts,” or “others in
the system with whom they have a relationship.”39 In
addition to allowing users to indicate bi-directional ties with
friends, family, and co-workers, many social network sites
allow users to create one-directional ties with celebrities,
music bands, businesses, organizations, and other entities.40
Examples include signing up as a “follower” of professional
basketball player Shaquille O’Neal on Twitter, a “friend” of
the rock group U2 on MySpace, or a “fan” of Coca-Cola on
Facebook.41 Users can also create and join groups based on
common interests or events. For example, many schools
have increased attendance at reunions by setting up group
pages on Facebook.42
As more people are spending time checking their
Facebook account or reading tweets from other Twitter
users, it is not surprising that many brands are migrating
to social network sites. Brands use these sites as a tool to
“keep in touch with and engage their customers.”43 More
consisting of alphanumeric characters (A-Z, 0-9) or symbols, such as the name of
a person or company (the method used by Facebook starting in June 2009). Id.
The latter type of file name is often called a “username” or “vanity URL.”
Posting of Blaise DiPersia to The Facebook Blog, Coming Soon: Facebook
Usernames, http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=90316352130 (June 9, 2009,
15:11); Posting of Caroline McCarthy to The Social, Facebook Vanity URLs
Coming
This
Week,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-1026100936.html?tag=mncol (June 9, 2009, 14:20 PDT).
38. E.g., Twitter: Create an Account, https://twitter.com/signup (last visited
June 15, 2010) (“Your full name will appear on your public profile”).
39. Boyd & Ellison, supra note 36, at 211, 213.
40. Id. at 213.
41. THE_REAL_SHAQ on Twitter, http://twitter.com/THE_REAL_SHAQ
(last visited June 10, 2010); U2 on MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/u2 (last
visited June 10, 2010); Coca-Cola on Facebook, supra note 7.
42. See Gilbert Cruz, How Facebook Is Affecting School Reunions, TIME, June
15, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1904565,00.html.
43. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Twitter,
Email and Brand Engagement, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/
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brands are interacting with the public in new and creative
ways that may strengthen the brand image and ultimately
increase sales of their goods and services.
Some brands use their social network site accounts to
answer questions, respond to complaints, or provide
information about products, prices, and discounts. For
example, in the summer of 2009, Dell claimed it “surpassed
$2 million in revenue” by posting offers and responding to
questions on its DellOutlet account on Twitter, and noted
the account drove “interest in new product as well.”44 Dell
also posts coupons on its Twitter account, which are
“retweeted and picked up by coupon sites—both of which
spread the brand name.”45 Some mom-and-pop stores and
restaurants find social media to be “accessible, free and very
simple,” and tweet about discounts or “lure customers with
mouth-watering descriptions of food.”46 Coca-Cola’s Twitter
account not only has random facts about the company and
its products, but in early September 2009 it had tweets
about sporting events, recycling, and the Heroes for Hope
tour sponsored by the breast cancer survivor organization
Susan G. Komen for the Cure.47

(June 17, 2009, 7:03). Recent books that discuss how brands can use social
network sites or “social media” include JOEL COMM, TWITTER POWER: HOW TO
DOMINATE YOUR MARKET ONE TWEET AT A TIME (2009); ERIK QUALMAN,
SOCIALNOMICS: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE LIVE AND DO
BUSINESS (2009).
44. Posting of Stefanie N. to Direct2Dell, @DellOutlet Surpasses $2 Million
on Twitter, http://en.community.dell.com/dell-blogs/b/direct2dell/archive/2009/
06/11/delloutlet-surpasses-2-million-on-twitter.aspx (June 11, 2009, 23:01).
45. Twitter, Twitter 101—Case Study: Dell, http://business.twitter.com/
twitter101/case_dell (last visited June 10, 2010).
46. Claire Cain Miller, Mom-and-Pop Operators Turn to Social Media, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2009, at B6.
47. Postings of CoTweet to Coca-Cola on Twitter, http://twitter.com/cocacola
(Sept. 10, 2009, 6:30; Sept. 10, 2009, 9:30; & Sept. 12, 2009, 7:04) [hereinafter
Coca-Cola on Twitter]. The nature of such posts may make it difficult for courts
to determine whether this expression should be treated as advertising or
information. Cf. Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 237-45 (2006) (discussing how recent
developments in the advertising industry, such as product placement,
“advertainment,” “experiential marketing,” and viral advertising, make it more
difficult for courts to distinguish between advertising and entertainment).
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In addition to providing a new forum for brands to
promote their goods or services in non-traditional ways,
social network sites also permit markholders to learn more
about their customers. Many sites allow users to control
who sees what information about them. Users often share
their personal information and other content on their social
network site page with those people or entities with whom
they have a connection, including brands.
Unfortunately, users sometimes accidentally become a
friend, fan, or follower of an imposter who has created a
fake social network site page.48 The individual behind the
fake account may use a person’s or entity’s name or
trademarks in the username, account name, or in other
identifying information on the site.49 Social network sites
vary in terms of the extent to which pages or profiles are
deemed to be authentic.50 For example, users of LiveJournal
often do not identify themselves using their real names,51
while Facebook encourages members to use their “true
name” and trust the accuracy of user profiles in this online

48. Users may also knowingly choose to link to a fake account because they
find the posts to be entertaining. For example, after it was disclosed that one
popular Twitter feed from 30 Rock star Tina Fey was fake, the number of
followers jumped from 50,000 to 200,000. Mike Musgrove, Is It Twitter or Is It
Baloney?, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 5, 2009, at A14.
49. Social network site users have impersonated movie stars, politicians, food
critics, and athletes, among other individuals. See Kevin Courtney, Con Text:
Fakebooking, IR. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at 18; Gregory B. Hladky, Republicans
Overtweet, HARTFORD ADVOC., Oct. 22, 2009, at 8, available at
http://www.hartfordadvocate.com/featured-news/republicans-overtweet-2.html;
Kim Severson, Fight Escalates over Twitter Parody of N.Y. Food Critic, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Apr. 24, 2009, at 18; Ralph Vacchiano & Michael O’Keeffe,
Athletes Are All Aflutter over Social Site, but Don’t Believe All You Read, DAILY
NEWS, June 7, 2009, at 70; Richard Wilson, Rising Profile of Facebook Fakers,
SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Aug. 24, 2008, at 7, available at 2008 WLNR 16353666.
50. See generally Danah Boyd, None of This Is Real: Identity and
Participation in Friendster, in STRUCTURES OF PARTICIPATION IN DIGITAL
CULTURE 132 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2008) (discussing the use of fake identities or
invented profiles by “Fakesters” on the social network site Friendster).
51. Posting of Rebecca Tushnet to Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)log, IPSC:
Trademark and the Consumer, http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2009/08/ipsctrademark-and-consumer.html (Aug. 6, 2009, 13:13) (comment by Rebecca
Tushnet on a presentation by Lisa Ramsey).
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environment.52 At the time of this writing, Twitter was
experimenting with a “Verified Account” feature “[t]o
prevent identity confusion”; once Twitter determines an
account is authentic, that Twitter account will display a
“Verified Account” badge “in the top-right portion of a user’s
profile page just above the name, location, and bio.”53
The public is more likely to be confused into thinking a
fake social network site account is authentic if it appears on
a “true name” site like Facebook or indicates it is “verified”
on Twitter. Confusion is also likely if there are explicit
statements that the account is “official” or “real,” or that
posts are written by the markholder’s representatives.
Other content that may suggest a fake account is official
includes posts that seem authentic or that are actually
copied from other official social network site accounts or
blogs,54 links to the official company website, an email
address that contains the mark, the display of photographs
of the company’s products or offices (often copied from the
Internet),55 or the display of the markholder’s logos or
stylized marks. Of course, a social network site page may
include some of this content but not actually confuse anyone
because other content indicates the page is fake.
There are various ways a social network site user can
communicate that a fake account is not official and
52. Facebook,
Usernames:
Intellectual
Property
Rights
Holders,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=899 (follow “What are the guidelines
around creating a username?” hyperlink) (last visited June 10, 2010) (“Your
username should be as close as possible to your true name”); see also Justin
Smith, Exclusive: Discussing the Future of Facebook with CEO Mark
Zuckerberg,
INSIDE
FACEBOOK,
June
3,
2009,
http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/06/03/exclusive-discussing-the-future-offacebook-with-ceo-mark-zuckerberg/ (“Facebook has always focused on
establishing real identity and user profiles, and that identity continues to be
foundational for all the company’s products and monetization plans today.”).
53. Twitter, Verified Account, http://twitter.com/help/verified/ (last visited
June 10, 2010).
54. E.g., False Twitter Account, supra note 14 (“Most [posts] re-wrote or
twisted tweets from our personal pages or portions of blogs from
TannerFriedman.com so that their meanings were lost or compromised.”).
55. E.g., Nine West Complaint, supra note 12, at 7-9, ¶¶ 18-19 (alleging the
Nine West Shoes account holder linked to the official company site, used a
Gmail
account
that
contained
the
Nine
West
mark
(ninewest.audition@gmail.com), and copied official photos posted on the Nine
West website).
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discourage any notion that it is authored by the markholder
even though the username, account name, or other content
incorporates another’s mark. Identity confusion may be
eliminated by inclusion of the words “fake,” “parody,”
“satire,” or similar words in a prominent place within the
content of the page. The user can also provide accurate
information about the registrant’s exact relationship (or
lack thereof) with the markholder in a disclaimer. In
addition, confusion can be dispelled or reduced by inserting
certain words before or after the mark in the username,
account name, or other identifying information on the site to
describe the content of the page (e.g., fake[mark],
[mark]sucks, not[mark], [mark]news, or [mark]info) or to
indicate the author of information on the site (e.g.,
[mark]employee, [mark]fan, [mark]customer, [mark]repair,
[mark]reseller, or [mark]victim). If the content of the page
is outrageous or inconsistent with past information provided
by the markholder, this may also raise a “red flag” to
readers that the social network site page is not official.56
Impersonation of brands on social network sites may
cause a variety of harms if users believe and rely on the
imposter’s false statement of identity. If users disclose
personal information to the imposter, identity theft,
phishing, or an increase in spam emails may occur.57 Even if
the user suffers no financial harm, he or she may feel
violated—think of the women who sent photos and contact
information to the fake Nine West Shoes account holder on
Facebook. If goods or services promoted on the page are
falsely represented to come from the markholder, customers
may mistakenly purchase another company’s products,
which may be of lower quality. If the imposter posts false or
misleading information about the company or its products,
this can harm the markholder and the public if stock prices
drop, or if individuals or entities forgo future purchases,
employment, partnerships, or other interaction with the
company due to the untruthful information. While it may be
difficult to prove causation for some types of harms, it is not
56. See Holtz, supra note 10 (noting the ExxonMobilCorp account “should
have raised some red flags immediately” because of graphic images on the
account that were inconsistent with statements made by Exxon and responses
to questions that would provoke anger and hostility).
57. See Tom N. Jagatic et al., Social Phishing, 50 COMM. ACM 94, 94-100
(2007).
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unreasonable to assume that certain unauthorized uses of a
mark to impersonate a brand on social network sites can
cause significant harm.
To prevent username squatting and the creation of fake
pages, some brands are preemptively registering usernames
incorporating their marks on Facebook, Twitter, and other
social network sites.58 Registration is often free and quick,
but the time, money, and energy it takes to register the
company’s trademarks (and variations of them) as
usernames on several sites is not insignificant. Adding
content and posting regularly to the account will consume
even more company resources, but some users may
complain if brands do not use their account after registering
the username. Markholders who are diligent about
registering their marks as domain names with all the
current top level domains will likely find it impossible to
keep track of the increasing number of social network sites
and register usernames with each one. Even if markholders
register usernames on all the top sites today, this will not
prevent future username squatting or fake pages on new
sites. Regardless, commentators still urge markholders to
acquire the usernames or account names “that are most
likely to be construed as official accounts” on popular social
network sites, as past incidents of brandjacking “should
make it painfully clear just how easy it is for somebody to
step in and represent your organization with inaccurate and
even damaging information using these very channels.”59
Of course, not all registrants of usernames or account
names
containing
another’s
marks
are
actually
impersonating markholders on social network sites. An
individual may register his or her personal name as a
username, but that name may be identical or similar to a
trademark owned by someone else. In addition, companies
or organizations may have concurrent trademark rights to

58. Markholders may also consider contractually requiring employees and
others with whom they have a relationship to refrain from using the marks in
certain ways without authorization on social network sites. Such a rule would
give the brand more control over its marks, but this approach could harm the
free flow of information and ideas.
59. Holtz, supra note 10.

2010]

BRANDJACKING ON SOCIAL NETWORKS

867

the term in different geographic areas or product categories,
such as Apple Computers and Apple Records.60
Moreover, some social network site users may be
engaging in expression protected by the First Amendment
when they use another’s mark without authorization to
convey information or ideas. Fans of a brand may set up an
unauthorized page for that brand because one does not
currently exist, and they want to link to the brand and
thereby communicate that they like the product. An
example is the Coca-Cola Facebook fan page created by
Dusty Sorg and Michael Jedrzejewski.61 An individual with
personal knowledge about a company or organization may
set up a social network site account that provides
information about the markholder that is relevant to
employees, stockholders, potential investors, competitors,
customers, or the general public. This person’s commentary
may be critical or laudatory. Representatives of a company
may use another’s trademarked term (e.g., Amazon) in good
faith to describe the qualities or characteristics of that
company’s own goods or services, such as Amazon River
Cruises.62 Third parties may also use another’s marks on a
social network site to engage in parody or satire, or as a
prank. In some cases, pretending to be the markholder may
be part of the joke. This is not really impersonation,
however, unless a reasonable person would actually think
the markholder maintains the site and that the posts are
written by the markholder’s representatives.
Popular social network sites such as Facebook,
MySpace, and Twitter prohibit impersonation of others and
the posting of content that violates the law, including
trademark laws.63 Some sites also permit markholders to
60. See Apple, http://www.apple.com (last visited June 10, 2010); The
Complete Apple Records, http://www.schomakers.com (last visited June 10,
2010).
61. See supra note 7.
62. While “Amazon” is a well-known mark for a popular online store,
Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com (last visited June 10, 2010), Amazon is
also the name of a river in South America, and some companies use this word to
describe their cruise services on the Amazon River. See, e.g., Amazon River
Cruises, http://www.amazonrivercruises.com (last visited June 10, 2010).
63. See, e.g., Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, §§ 4.1, 5
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited June 14, 2010);
MySpace.com, Terms of Use Agreement, §§ 8.16, 8.26 (June 25, 2009),
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited June 14,
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file a complaint when third parties use their trademarks
without authorization in usernames or other content on the
site.64 If the social network site deems the complaint to be
valid, it will likely remove (or ask the user to remove) the
infringing content, and may suspend or even terminate the
user’s
account.
Such
private
notice-and-takedown
procedures for resolving trademark disputes are usually
quicker and less expensive than trademark litigation,65 and
may help social network sites avoid allegations of
contributory infringement.66
One important question, however, is whether social
network sites will properly balance trademark and free
speech interests when they privately resolve these disputes.
To avoid lawsuits or liability under trademark law, some
social network sites may err on the side of deleting all
allegedly infringing content that incorporates another’s
marks. This approach could stifle the free flow of
2010); Twitter, Terms of Service (Sept. 18, 2009), https://twitter.com/tos (last
visited June 10, 2010); Twitter, Twitter Support: Impersonation Policy (Jan. 14,
2009), http://twitter.zendesk.com/forums/26257/entries/18366 (last visited June
14, 2010); Twitter, Twitter Support: The Twitter Rules (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://help.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/18311 (last visited June 10, 2010).
64. See, e.g., Facebook, Facebook Copyright Policy: How to Report Claims of
Intellectual
Property
Infringement,
http://www.facebook.com/legal/
copyright.php?howto_report (last visited June 14, 2010) (providing links to
automated forms to report copyright infringement and other claims of
intellectual property infringement by a Facebook user); Twitter, Twitter
Support:
Trademark
Policy
(Jan.
14,
2009),
http://twitter.
zendesk.com/forums/26257/entries/18367 (last visited June 10, 2010) (providing
guidelines for filing a complaint when third parties misuse trademarks).
65. Some commentators propose the creation of a private “Uniform Username
Dispute Resolution Policy” for resolving trademark disputes involving
usernames, similar to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
adopted by registrars accredited by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers. See, e.g., Posting to ErikJHeels.com, How to Twittersquat
the Top 100 Brands, http://erikjheels.com/?p=1298 (Jan. 8, 2009) (recommending
that social network sites work together to create a Uniform Username Dispute
Resolution Policy); see also Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers,
Domain
Name
Dispute
Resolution
Policies,
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/ (last visited June 14, 2010) (providing
information about the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and
other policies that apply to domain name disputes). Evaluation of such a
proposal is beyond the scope of this Article.
66. See supra note 31.
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information and ideas.67 Some sites may claim they allow
marks to be used without authorization in fan accounts,
parody, and other commentary,68 but their decision-making
process for allowing or banning certain content may not be
transparent or predictable.
Another problem is that it is unclear whether and how
trademark law applies to certain unauthorized uses of
marks on social network sites. Markholders have recently
filed lawsuits against social network sites and their users,69
but, as of this writing, there is no specific statutory
provision or binding common law that directly addresses
whether accused infringers are liable in this context.70 This
67. Although there is likely no “state action,” and thus no First Amendment
violation, if a private social network site provider prohibits the use of another’s
trademarks on its site, free speech interests will still be harmed by this decision.
If a markholder files a trademark lawsuit and asks a court to enjoin or punish
the third party’s use of its mark, however, this would constitute “state action”
and implicate the First Amendment under constitutional law. See Ramsey,
Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 407-09.
68. For example, “Twitter users are allowed to create parody, commentary, or
fan accounts . . . [But a]ccounts with the clear intent to confuse or mislead may
be permanently suspended.” Twitter, Twitter Support: Impersonation Policy
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://twitter.zendesk.com/forums/26257/entries/18366 (last
visited June 14, 2010); see also Twitter, Twitter Support: Parody, Commentary,
and Fan Accounts Policy (Feb. 1, 2009), http://help.twitter.com/
forums/26810/entries/106373 (last visited June 14, 2010).
69. See, e.g., New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., __ F.
Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 808885 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2010) (granting a preliminary
injunction to the owner of the marks “The New York City Triathlon,” “The NYC
Triathlon” and “The NYC Tri” after finding infringement by the seller of
triathlon equipment that registered and used the username “nyctriclub” and
ordering the defendant to refrain from using the marks on Facebook, Twitter,
LinkedIn, and other websites); Complaint, Oneok, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. 09CV-00597 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 2009), available at 2009 WL 3146140; Tanner
Friedman Complaint, supra note 14; Nine West Complaint, supra note 12;
Complaint, LaRussa v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-09-488101 (Cal. Super. May 6,
2009), available at 2009 WL 1569936.
70. Past court decisions and commentary regarding the unauthorized use of
marks in domain names, blog names, and parts of a URL other than the secondlevel domain may provide some guidance to courts and social network sites in
resolving these disputes. See, e.g., Interactive Prod. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office
Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 696-98 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that unauthorized
use of the Lap Traveler mark for portable computer stands in the URL
a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkflt-lt.htm is not likely to confuse
consumers because the post-domain path of a URL does not typically indicate
source); Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C 96-2703
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will make it more difficult for social network sites to develop
trademark policies that are fair to both markholders and
users, and also protect themselves from claims of
contributory trademark liability.
As discussed in the next Part, some courts will likely
conclude there is no trademark infringement if the mark is
not used in connection with the advertising or sale of goods
or services. Other courts may find an infringement violation
if the third party uses another’s mark to impersonate a
markholder and cause confusion about the source of
expression on the site. Courts and social network sites
should try to balance trademark and free speech interests in
these disputes, and consider whether a decision to restrict a
certain unauthorized use of another’s mark may harm the
public’s interest in freedom of expression.
Although social network site usernames may seem akin
to Internet domain names, the bad faith registration and
use of another’s mark in a username does not appear to
violate federal law prohibiting cybersquatting of domain
names. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) only applies to the registration, trafficking in, or
use of a “domain name that . . . is identical or confusingly
similar to [another’s] mark” with a bad faith intent to
TEH, 1997 WL 811770, at *4 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997) (“Nothing in the postdomain path of a URL indicates a website’s source of origin, and Patmont has
cited no case in which the use of a trademark within a URL’s path formed the
basis of a trademark violation.”); Margreth Barrett, Domain Names,
Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries,
39 CONN. L. REV. 973 (2007) [hereinafter Barrett, Domain Names] (discussing
trademark disputes involving domain names and arguing that many court
decisions do not adequately protect free speech interests); Jacqueline D. Lipton,
Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, and the First Amendment
in Cyberspace, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1327 (2006) (same); Posting of Eric Goldman
to CircleID, Google Sued for Trademark Infringement Based on Third-Level
Subdomain,http://www.circleid.com/posts/google_sued_for_trademark_infringem
ent_on_third_level_subdomain/ (Dec. 30, 2005, 10:19 PDT) (noting use of
another’s mark in a blog name can give rise to trademark infringement, but
noting there may be a difference in the trademark analysis when the mark is
used in a third-level subdomain rather than a second-level domain name);
Posting of Marty Schwimmer to The Trademark Blog, Can Similar Blogs Names
Co-exist?
Should
Blogs
Obtain
Trademark
Protection?,
http://www.schwimmerlegal.com/archives/2005/07/can_similar_blo.html
(July
11, 2005, 18:44) (concluding that blog titles can be protected as trademarks); see
also Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003)
(discussing various methods for allocating property rights in domain names).
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profit.71 The federal trademark statute defines a “domain
name” as “any alphanumeric designation which is
registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name registration
authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.”72
This definition does not cover usernames on social network
sites, as they are not registered with or assigned by a
domain name registrar or registry.73 Of course, courts may
apply trademark infringement law to username squatting
by third parties, just like they did in cases of domain name
squatting before the enactment of the ACPA.74
Impersonation of markholders on the Internet is not a
new phenomenon. Third parties have been registering the
trademarks of others as Internet domain names with
corresponding fake websites for years.75 Yet usernames and
account names on Facebook, Twitter, and similar social
network sites often communicate more information about
identity than domain names. There is a higher risk of
impersonation on sites where the username or account
name becomes the identity of the poster. Unless a particular
site encourages the use of pseudonyms or fake identities,
use of another’s mark in a username or account name is
generally more likely to cause confusion about the source of
expression linked to that name. This is especially true if the
social network site has a true name culture like Facebook or
verifies the accounts of its users like Twitter. If reasonable
persons believe a fake account on a social network site is
real—if they believe the author of the expression is an
official spokesperson for the markholder due to the content
of the social network site page—this confusing use of
another’s mark may violate trademark infringement law.

71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
73. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 (1999); 145 CONG. REC. S14715
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999), discussed in 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:78 n.66.
74. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:77 (citing cases).
75. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
infringement where a pro-life activist used the Planned Parenthood mark in the
domain name plannedparenthood.com and the related website home page that
said “Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE!”).
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II. IMPERSONATION OF MARKHOLDERS ON SOCIAL NETWORK
SITES: UNLAWFUL BRANDJACKING OR PROTECTED SPEECH?
As noted previously, it is not entirely clear whether
trademark infringement law covers certain unauthorized
uses of a mark on a social network site. If the accused
infringer is not advertising or selling goods or services, that
third party may claim trademark law does not apply or that
this expression is protected by the First Amendment. These
arguments may not prevail under current trademark and
free speech doctrine, however, if the mark is being used to
impersonate the markholder and cause reasonable people to
be confused about the source of the third party’s expression
on the site. In such circumstances, markholders may be able
to satisfy the elements of a federal claim for trademark
infringement, and refute the accused infringer’s claims of
fair use or a First Amendment defense. On the other hand,
courts are more likely to find there is no infringement
liability where the third party is using the mark in
expression on a social network site to accurately describe
that person’s own goods or services, refer to the markholder
(such as in comparative advertising or news reporting), or
communicate parody, satire, criticism, or other commentary.
A. Trademark Infringement on Social Network Sites
Two provisions in the federal trademark statute—also
known as the Lanham Act—provide a cause of action for
infringement: 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), which applies only to
marks registered on the federal principal register, and 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), which applies to both registered and
unregistered marks. To infringe another’s registered mark,
§ 1114(1)(a) provides that the third party must engage in
“use in commerce” of the mark “in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services” in a context that “is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.”76 A third party is liable for
infringement under § 1125(a)(1)(A) if it “uses in commerce”
another’s mark “on or in connection with any goods or
services” where that use is likely to cause confusion,
mistake, or deception regarding the “affiliation, connection,
or association” of that person with the markholder, or as to
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
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the “origin, sponsorship, or approval” of that person’s
“goods, services, or commercial activities.”77
Thus, to establish a prima facie claim of trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act, the markholder must
establish that the third party used the markholder’s valid
and protectable mark without authorization in commerce in
connection with goods, services, or commercial activities
where this use of the mark is likely to cause confusion.78
Courts in some circuits may also require proof of
commercial use and/or trademark use of the mark. An
accused infringer will likely argue the markholder has not
established one or more of these elements—(1) use in
commerce; (2) use in connection with goods, services, or
commercial activities; (3) commercial use; (4) trademark
use; or (5) likelihood of confusion—and may also argue this
is permissible fair use of the mark or is protected expression
under the First Amendment.
1. Use in Commerce
Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A) both require use of
a mark “in commerce” for infringement liability. Courts and
commentators note the term “commerce” in both
infringement statutes is jurisdictional—Congress may only
regulate commerce within its control, and thus a mark must
be used in commerce for the federal trademark statute to
apply.79 Use of a mark in the username, account name, or
content of a social network site page that is accessible to
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
78. For examples of the elements of a claim for federal trademark
infringement, see McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005); and 4-5
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 23:11.50, 27:13. National trademark laws are
generally territorial. Markholders must have trademark rights within a nation’s
borders to sue under that nation’s trademark laws and the allegedly unlawful
use of the mark should generally take place within that nation’s borders. This
Article assumes that the markholder has valid and protectable rights under
U.S. trademark law and that the mark is being used without authorization
within the U.S. sufficiently to trigger the applicability of our national trademark
laws.
79. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir.
2005); United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d
86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1997); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:57; see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 8; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “commerce” as “all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress”).
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other users on the Internet will generally satisfy the
Lanham Act’s jurisdictional use “in commerce” requirement,
as Congress’s power to regulate commerce is quite broad.80
Some courts and commentators contend that the “use[s]
in commerce” language in §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A),
together with the definition of “use in commerce” in § 1127,
contain an additional or different requirement for a prima
facie infringement claim which limits infringement law to
certain types of uses of a mark.81 Section 1127 defines the
term “use in commerce” to mean “the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark.”82 The provision further states
that a mark is “deemed to be in use in commerce” when the
mark is visibly placed on goods “sold or transported in
commerce” (such as Nike shoes) or is “used or displayed in
the sale or advertising of services and the services are
rendered in commerce” (such as an advertisement for
Southwest Airlines travel services).83 Under this view, the
markholder must establish as a threshold requirement one
of these types of “use” of its mark by the accused infringer;
“use” and “in commerce” are distinct elements of an
infringement claim.84
Other courts and commentators argue § 1127’s narrow
definition of “use in commerce” is solely for purposes of
qualifying for registration in the first instance, and does not
apply to the type of use of a mark required by third parties

80. See, e.g., Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. &
Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1054 (10th Cir. 2008); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947
F. Supp. 1227, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
81. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406-08,
412 (2d Cir. 2005); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936, 939 (8th
Cir. 2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 757-61
(E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723,
727-28 (E.D. Va. 2003); WHS Entm’t Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int’l
Union, 997 F. Supp. 946, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Barrett, Domain Names, supra
note 70, at 983-84; Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise
of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 382-86 (2006) [hereinafter
Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits].
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
83. Id.
84. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407-12.
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to trigger trademark liability.85 Under this view, the
relevant language in §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A) is the
jurisdictional word “commerce,” not “use in commerce.”86
According to the Second Circuit, “[t]he history and text of
the Lanham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects
Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority
under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the
Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of a trademark.”87 A full
discussion and resolution of the debate over the meaning of
the phrase “use in commerce” in §§ 1114(1)(a) and
1125(a)(1)(A) is beyond the scope of this Article.
In those circuits that apply the § 1127 definition of “use
in commerce” to limit infringement claims, courts are likely
to hold that certain types of third party uses of another’s
mark on a social network site do not count as “use in
commerce.” When marks are only used in usernames,
account names, or the content posted on social network
sites, there is no affixation of the mark to any goods that are
sold or transported in commerce. There is also no “use in
commerce” of the mark for services in trademark disputes
involving the use of another’s mark in parody, satire,
criticism, and other commentary if the third party is not
using the mark in the sale or advertising of services
rendered in commerce. On the other hand, if the accused
infringer is using another’s mark on the social network site
in advertising for its own services rendered in commerce,
this could qualify as “use in commerce” under the definition
in § 1127. An example would be a post on the social network
site that is a comparative advertisement for travel services
by a competitor of Southwest Airlines; the competitor may
85. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1024 n.11 (9th Cir. 2004); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 23:11.50, 25:57;
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1609-12 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie &
Janis, Confusion Over Use]. For a recent discussion of the meaning of the “use[s]
in commerce” language in §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A), see the Second
Circuit’s Appendix in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131-41 (2d
Cir. 2009).
86. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005).
87. United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d
86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920
(2d Cir. 1998).
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claim in the post that it has less expensive airline tickets or
better service than Southwest Airlines.
2. Use of the Mark in Connection with Goods, Services,
or Commercial Activities
To be liable for infringement under the Lanham Act, an
accused infringer must also use a registered mark “in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services” per § 1114(1)(a), or use
a registered or unregistered mark on or in connection with
any “goods,” “services,” or “commercial activities” per
§ 1125(a)(1)(A).88 Even if use of a mark on a social network
site satisfies the “use in commerce” requirement, this use
may not necessarily be deemed a use in connection with
goods, services, or commercial activities; these are both
independent requirements.89
In some cases involving the unauthorized use of marks
in usernames, account names, and/or the content of social
network sites, it will be easy for the markholder to prove
that the accused infringer used the mark in connection with
goods, services, or commercial activities. For example,
assume a competitor of Dell, rather than Dell, registers
DellComputers as a username on Facebook or Twitter and
indicates that the account name of the social network site
registrant is Dell Computers. In its posts, the third party
provides information about deals for its “Dell” computers
with links to a website or street address of a store where the
goods can be purchased, but it is really advertising and
selling its own brand of computers, not Dell computers. This
third party competitor is using another’s mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, and advertising
of goods in an attempt to divert consumers to its own
product. This is classic trademark infringement—
misleading use of a mark by a competitor in commercial
speech that falsely represents the source of the goods to be
Dell.
On the other hand, it may also be clear that the social
network site user is not using the mark in connection with
goods, services, or commercial activities. For example,
courts will likely find that merely registering a
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
89. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research,
527 F.3d 1045, 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).
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trademarked word as a username on a social network site
does not, in and of itself, constitute use of the mark in
connection with goods, services, or commercial activities
under the Lanham Act. The third party would need to add
additional content to the social network site page linked to
that username before it could be liable for infringement.90
In some cases, the accused infringer may concede the
second element is satisfied, but still argue this use of the
mark in connection with goods, services, or commercial
activities causes no likelihood of confusion. Examples
include use of another’s mark by those who distribute,
resell, or repair the markholder’s goods to refer to the
markholder (a referential or “nominative” use of the mark),
or use of another’s trademarked descriptive term to describe
the qualities or characteristics of the third party’s goods or
services (a “descriptive” use of the mark). Another example
is nominative use of a competitor’s mark in the content of
comparative advertising for competing goods or services
that are less expensive or of higher quality, or use in an
advertisement for goods or services that comments on,
criticizes, or pokes fun at the competitor.
The more difficult cases for this second element involve
an accused infringer who is not advertising or selling any
goods or services on a social network site, and who is not
engaged in any commercial activities, but who is using the
mark in connection with the distribution of information or
other expression on the site. To satisfy the goods, services,
or commercial activities requirement for a prima facie
infringement claim in such circumstances, a markholder
may argue that its mark is being used in connection with
“services” on the social network site because the provision of
information to others qualifies as an “information service.”
News organizations use trademarks to identify and
distinguish their information goods and services. They can
also obtain federal trademark registrations for such marks.
For example, The New York Times Company owns a
90. Cf. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 318 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that
courts must look at the underlying content of the website linked to an allegedly
infringing domain name); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:76 (“In the author’s
view, neither merely reserving a domain name nor use of a domain name solely
to indicate a site on the Internet, in and of itself, constitutes ‘goods or services’
in the Lanham Act sense. Rather, one must consider the content of the site
identified by the domain name.”).
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registration for the trademark “The New York Times” for
“Daily Newspapers” (goods) and a service mark for the same
term for “computer on-line services, namely, providing a
wide range of general interest news and information via a
global computer network” (services).91 To readers of The
New York Times, the mark indicates that the markholder is
the one distributing the expression contained in the print
newspaper or online news service located at the domain
name nytimes.com.92 Moreover, political, religious, and
charitable groups and other nonprofit organizations, such as
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, use trademarks
to identify and distinguish their goods and services. As
noted by Professor McCarthy, “[t]he retention of a distinct
identity here is just as important as it is to a commercial
company.”93 If third parties can be liable for infringement if
they use “The New York Times” or the “Planned
Parenthood” marks in connection with the distribution of
their own information,94 why not individuals who use
another’s mark in connection with the distribution of
information and other expression on Facebook, Twitter, and
other social network sites?
Some courts have broadly interpreted the definition of
“services” where the defendant was using another’s mark in
connection with the dissemination of information.95 For
91. U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 0,227,904 (filed Jan. 27, 1927) (issued May 17,
1927); U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,120,865 (filed Feb. 9, 1996) (issued Dec. 16,
1997).
92. See Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 35, at 1440-41; see also
id. at 1379, 1398, 1406-09 (noting that corporate entities that create
expression—sometimes through the works of several individuals—often use
their trademarked name to identify the source of their expression).
93. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 9:5.
94. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of
Worcester, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 n.8 (Mass. 1986) (“We also point out that
it makes no difference whether either PPLM or PP, Inc. is a charitable
corporation for purposes of maintaining a common law service mark
infringement action [under state law].”).
95. E.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128
F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314 (noting courts
have been reluctant to define the terms “goods” and “services” narrowly to
exclude information); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:76; cf. People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365-66 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“To use PETA’s mark ‘in connection with’ goods or services, Doughney need not
have actually sold or advertised goods or services on the www.peta.org website.
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example, the Second Circuit found a political organization
used the “United We Stand America” mark in connection
with services when it engaged in political activities,
including the provision of political information to the
public.96 The Southern District of New York recently held
that the activities of a nonprofit organization that promotes
the rights of restaurant workers “qualify as ‘services’ as
defined by the Lanham Act” where that group tried to raise
awareness of the work conditions of restaurant employees
by circulating informational leaflets with the restaurant’s
logo on the front.97 When pro-life activist Richard Bucci
operated a fake Planned Parenthood website at the domain
name plannedparenthood.com, the Southern District of New
York held Bucci “offers informational services for use in
convincing people that certain activities, including the use
of [Planned Parenthood’s] services, are morally wrong,” and
thus Bucci used the organization’s mark “in connection with
the distribution of those services over the Internet.”98 Some
courts may apply a similar analysis in trademark disputes
involving the unauthorized use of marks on social network
sites and conclude the mark is being used in connection
with the distribution of information services in a context
covered by the infringement provisions of the Lanham Act.
A fictional example may be helpful in clarifying how
courts may find the use in connection with goods, services,
or commercial activities requirement satisfied in these
circumstances. Assume that our fictional registrant of
DellComputers on Twitter or Facebook mentioned above is
not trying to pass off its own computers as Dell computers,
but is instead disseminating information under the
DellComputers name. This person posts comments about
the features of Dell computers, future Dell products in
development, the activities of the company, and general
news and information about computers and the computer
industry, among other things. The posts contain no
Rather, Doughney need only have prevented users from obtaining or using
PETA’s goods or services, or need only have connected the website to other’s
goods or services.”).
96. United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 89-92.
97. SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Rest. LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
98. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).

880

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

advertisements for computers or computer services, and
there are no links to websites or directions to places where
consumers can purchase goods or services related to
computers. Each day when this individual writes about
Dell, its products, and the computer industry, the posts may
be read by stockbrokers, consumers, employees,
competitors, and other members of the public. If there is
nothing to indicate otherwise, some people might think this
account is an official social network site page authored by
Dell representatives. Members of the public followed the
ExxonMobilCorp and TannerFriedman accounts on Twitter
and joined the Nine West—Model Auditions group page on
Facebook believing official representatives of the
markholders had created the content on those sites.
If consumers are truly confused about the author of
information disseminated on a social network site, the
markholder will likely want to get control of the account or
close it down. This is especially the case where the third
party is disseminating false or misleading information in
the content of the site. Using the fictional DellComputers
account example, the imposter could provide erroneous
advice about Dell computers that allows a virus to infect the
user’s computer. That person could also disseminate false
statements of fact—such as a newly-discovered product
defect, a delay in a product launch, or the illness of a key
executive in the company—that could cause members of the
public to forgo purchasing the markholder’s goods, sell their
stock, decline future employment or partnerships with the
company, or make other decisions harmful to themselves or
the markholder. In such circumstances, it is possible that
courts will find the mark is being used by that person in
connection with the provision of information services.
In response, accused infringers will likely argue that
the District Court for the District of Columbia was correct
when it held that “[p]urveying points of view is not a
service” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.99 There are
99. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 1985)
(holding that a public interest group’s use of the phrase “star wars” in television
messages to criticize the Reagan Administration’s strategic defense initiative
did not infringe a filmmaker’s “Star Wars” mark). Moreover, the court said
“[e]ven if promoting of ideas was considered to be conducting an educational
‘service,’ television messages that are only used to express those ideas do not
sell or advertise them.” Id.; see also Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and
its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A

2010]

BRANDJACKING ON SOCIAL NETWORKS

881

good reasons to define “services” narrowly to exclude the
dissemination of expression where the accused infringer is
not advertising or selling expression available for purchase
(unlike The New York Times Company). Otherwise,
markholders may attempt to use trademark infringement
lawsuits to stop people from talking about them or to
prevent the use of their marks in public discourse outside
the context of trade.100 If it is easy for markholders to satisfy
the threshold requirement of use in connection with goods,
services, or commercial activities, it will be more difficult for
judges to get rid of frivolous, speech-harmful infringement
lawsuits on a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment and avoid a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis
of likelihood of confusion. Litigation is expensive and timeconsuming, and accused infringers may settle and remove
the mark from the social network site rather than fight for
their right to use another’s marks to convey information or
ideas. Trademark infringement law will be quite expansive,
and risks stifling the free flow of information and ideas, if
courts deem any dissemination of information and other
expression to be a service under the Lanham Act. This
broad interpretation would cover use of another’s mark in
emails, blog posts, cybergripe and parody websites, and

HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404, 420 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark
D. Janis, eds., 2008) [hereinafter Goldman, Online Word of Mouth] (arguing that
cybergripers who complain about markholders on the Internet “are espousing
their opinions, not offering goods or services”). According to the Second Circuit
in United We Stand, the Lucasfilm “court reached the right result but did not
correctly describe the reason. If the court were right that communicating ideas
and purveying points of view is not a service subject to the controls established
by trademark law, then one who established a learning center would be free to
call it Harvard or Yale University. We do not think the Lucasfilm court
intended such a rule. In our view, the justification for denial of relief in
[Lucasfilm] lay in the fact that the defendants were using plaintiff’s mark not in
a manner that would create confusion as to source, but rather as part of a
message whose meaning depended on reference to plaintiff’s product.” United
We Stand, 128 F.3d at 91.
100. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Any harm to Bosley arises not from a competitor’s sale of a similar product
under Bosley’s mark, but from Kremer’s criticism of their services. Bosley
cannot use the Lanham Act either as a shield from Kremer’s criticism, or as a
sword to shut Kremer up.”); Lucasfilm, 622 F. Supp. at 934-35 (“These laws do
not reach into the realm of public discourse to regulate the use of terms used
outside the context of trade.”).
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many other communications that do not advertise or sell
goods or services.
Although courts would better protect speech interests if
they narrowly interpreted “services” in the infringement
provisions to exclude the dissemination of information to
others, such an interpretation may conflict with current
practices at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
Under current trademark law, it is possible to procure a
trademark registration for a mark used to identify the
source of information services even if this is not the
markholder’s primary focus.101 Per the PTO, an
informational website is more like a service than a good,
and there are various types of information services for
which a trademark registration may be obtained.102
Specimens of use submitted to the PTO with an application
for registration must show that the mark is being used in
commerce in such a way that consumers will associate the
mark as a service mark identifying the applicant’s
information services, not just its primary goods or
services.103 For example, an informational website for a
computer company must contain some “value-added”
activity beyond the mere advertising or selling of computers
or computer services to qualify for a separate registration
for the mark for the provision of information services.104
Communications about the markholder’s primary goods
or services on an official website are merely normal and
101. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 19:89.
102. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE §§ 1215.01-1215.10, 1202.07(b) (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter TMEP],
quoted in 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 7:17.50. A search of the terms
“information” and “services” in the PTO’s Trademark ID Manual on June 10,
2010, resulted in a list of 171 entries, most of which are for different classes of
services related to the provision of information services. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, U.S. ACCEPTABLE IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS & SERVICES MANUAL,
available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-brs?sect2=THESOFF&sect3=
PLURON&pg1=ALL&s1=information+services&l=MAX&sect1=IDMLICON&se
ct4=HITOFF&op1=AND&d=TIDM&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2Ftidm.html&r=0&
f=S (last visited June 10, 2010).
103. In re Walters, No. 77120372, 2009 WL 1719379, at *2-3 (T.T.A.B. May 28,
2009); In re Ralph Mantia Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284, 1286 (T.T.A.B. 2000);
TMEP, supra note 102, § 1301.04.
104. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 7:17.50 & n.13 (quoting TMEP, supra note
102, §1215.02(b) (1996 statement of policy)).
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ancillary to the sale of these goods or the rendering of the
principal service, and are not by themselves a service as
that term is used in the Lanham Act.105 On the other hand,
a markholder can register its mark for information services
if the content it disseminates includes information
unrelated to the markholder or its primary goods or
services, such as news about the markholder’s industry, tips
for leading a healthy life, or similar value-added
expression.106 An example is the pharmaceutical company
Pfizer Incorporated—owner of the registered trademark
“Viagra” for a “compound for treating erectile
dysfunction”107—who in 2007 obtained a registration for the
service mark “Viva Viagra” for “[m]edical information
services, namely, providing information relating to men’s
sexual health.”108

105. See id. §§ 7:17.50, 19:89; see, e.g., In re Dr Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (holding that conducting a contest to promote the sale of goods does
not qualify as rendering a separate “service” to others under the Lanham Act
because the contest was part of selling the applicant’s primary goods); In re
Moore Bus. Forms Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (holding that
a paper manufacturer does not render a separate “service” to others when it
rates the recycled content and recyclability of its own paper products because it
is simply providing information about its products to potential purchasers).
106. See 1, 3-4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 7:17.50, 19:89, 25:76 & n.12.
107. U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 2,162,548 (filed Apr. 12, 1996) (issued June 2,
1998).
108. U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 3,690,609 (filed Nov. 14, 2006) (issued Sept. 29,
2009). At the time of this writing, Pfizer had also applied to register the word
mark “Viva Viagra” as a trademark and service mark for “[p]rinted materials,
namely, booklets, pamphlets, paper displays and posters on the topic of men’s
sexual health” and “on-line information services, namely, providing information
relating to men’s sexual health via a global computer network.” U.S. Trademark
Ser. Application No. 77,043,506 (filed Nov. 14, 2006). Recently, Pfizer
successfully enforced the “Viva Viagra” mark in a suit against JetAngel.com—a
firm that sells outdoor mobile advertising on decommissioned military
equipment such as fighter jets and missiles—and its owner Arye Sachs. Pfizer
Inc. v. Sachs, No. 08 Civ. 8065(WHP), 2008 WL 4525418 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2008).
When Sachs used the stylized “Viva Viagra” mark without authorization
alongside a large yellow JetAngel.com banner on a decommissioned U.S. Air
Force missile to promote his advertising services, the court found infringement
because “consumers are likely to be confused as to the relationship between
Plaintiff and Defendants’ advertising.” Id. at *1, *4. The court rejected a First
Amendment defense after finding the mark was used in a way “to suggest that
Pfizer is the source of Defendants’ activities” and concluded this use of the mark
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Today, some markholders maintain social network site
accounts that disseminate information about their products
and other topics. Recall that Coca-Cola representatives
posted tweets on the brand’s Twitter account about sporting
events, recycling, and a fundraiser for a breast cancer
awareness group.109 Information about the markholder’s
products may assist current and potential customers, while
the other information may strengthen the markholder’s
brand image. Certain consumers may think a brand is more
hip or interesting—and buy the company’s branded goods,
services, or stock—if the markholder’s representatives are
actively participating on social network sites by posting
links to quirky news stories on the Internet or funny videos
on YouTube. If such uses of a mark are sufficient to justify
registration of the mark for information services (which is
unclear), some courts may find third parties are using the
mark in connection with information services if they use the
mark to identify the source of expression posted on the site.
For example, a person may be deemed to be rendering a
medical information service when he or she uses the “Viva
Viagra” mark in the username, account name, and/or
content of a social network site page that disseminates
information relating to men’s sexual health.
If the accused infringer is just using the mark to
communicate about the markholder or its products,
however, this expression may not qualify as use of the mark
in connection with information services. A markholder
cannot get trademark rights in a mark for the rendering of
information services simply by discussing its own
products,110 and thus some courts will likely conclude that a
third party also cannot be deemed to be using the mark for
information services when it is only posting comments
about the markholder or its products.111 If the third party is
using the mark to impersonate the markholder, however, it
was “likely to cause significant consumer confusion in the marketplace.” Id. at
*5.
109. Coca-Cola on Twitter, supra note 47.
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111. This may not matter for those courts and commentators who believe that
the use requirements for obtaining trademark rights, such as the “use in
commerce” requirement defined in § 1127, are different than the use
requirements that are sufficient to violate another’s trademark rights. See supra
Part II.A.1.
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may not matter if the focus is on the markholder’s products.
Courts may deem this use of the mark to be in connection
with the advertising of the markholder’s primary goods or
services (albeit fake advertising), and find the second
element of §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A) satisfied for this
reason.
3. Commercial Use of the Mark
Appellate courts in some circuits hold the use in
connection with goods, services, or commercial activities
language in the infringement statutes also implicitly
requires the markholder to establish “commercial use” of
the mark for a prima facie infringement claim.112 According
to the Sixth Circuit, “[t]he Lanham Act is constitutional
because it only regulates commercial speech, which is
entitled to reduced protections under the First
Amendment.”113 The infringement provisions do not
expressly apply to “noncommercial use of a mark,” and thus
interpreting §§ 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1)(A) to include an
implied commercial use limitation is not inconsistent with
the text of these provisions.114 Moreover, Professor
McCarthy has stated that use of another’s mark is not
“actionable under the Lanham Act” unless the accused
infringer uses “the challenged designation in some
commercial sense.”115
Courts in these circuits have found there is no
commercial use of the mark where an accused infringer
used another’s mark in a domain name that linked to a
noncommercial website that parodied, criticized, or
112. See, e.g. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. &
Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 2008); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v.
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674, 676-77 (9th Cir. 2005); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats,
319 F.3d 770, 774-75 (6th Cir. 2003).
113. Taubman, 319 F.3d at 774; see also Bosley, 403 F.3d at 677 (“As a matter
of First Amendment law, commercial speech may be regulated in ways that
would be impermissible if the same regulation were applied to noncommercial
expressions.”) (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995)).
When the commercial and noncommercial aspects of speech are “inextricably
intertwined,” the Supreme Court has held that courts should evaluate the
constitutionality of restrictions of that speech using the “test for fully protected
expression.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
114. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
115. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 25:76.
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otherwise commented on the markholder.116 If a third party
uses another’s mark without authorization in the username
or account name of a social network site and communicates
about the markholder in similar noncommercial expression,
some courts may conclude the markholder has not
established a prima facie case of infringement due to failure
to satisfy the commercial use requirement.
Other courts have held there is no commercial use
requirement for infringement liability in §§ 1114(1)(a) or
1125(a)(1)(A).117 Neither provision refers to “commercial use
of a mark” or use of the mark in “commercial speech.”
Section 1125(a)(1)(A) does use the phrase “commercial
activities” and the legislative history suggests this language
was intended to exclude political activities.118 Yet
§ 1114(1)(a) “contains no commercial activity requirement”
and the word “commercial” does not appear immediately
before “goods” or “services” in §§ 1114(1)(a) or
1125(a)(1)(A).119 Moreover, the text of the federal dilution
statute expressly exempts “noncommercial use of a mark”
from its application, but there is no such exception in the
infringement statutes.120 When construed in context, the
text of the infringement provisions suggests that Congress
either did not intend to limit the Lanham Act’s
infringement provisions to commercial use of a mark, or
decided to allow courts to determine whether the
116. See, e.g., Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1052-54 (finding no commercial
use of the “Utah Lighthouse” mark in a domain name and parody website);
Bosley, 403 F.3d at 677-80 (finding no commercial use of the “Bosley Medical”
mark in a domain name linked to a cybergripe website).
117. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc.,
128 F.3d 86, 89-93 (2d Cir. 1997); Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125,
1131 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d
Cir. 1998).
118. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 27:71, 27:95 (quoting 134 CONG. REC.
31,852 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
119. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1434; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006); see also Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d
309, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting the difference between the infringement and
dilution statutes, but declining to resolve “the difficult question” of what
constitutes commercial speech or determine whether the infringement
provisions apply exclusively to commercial speech because this use of the mark
did not cause a likelihood of confusion).

2010]

BRANDJACKING ON SOCIAL NETWORKS

887

infringement statutes should apply to noncommercial uses
of trademarks.
Courts have applied infringement law in trademark
disputes where there is no commercial use of the mark in
connection with the advertising or sale of commercial goods
or services. For example, courts have found political,
religious, and social organizations infringed the trademarks
of others under the Lanham Act when they used the marks
to identify their own goods, services, or activities.121
Moreover, the terms “goods” and “services” in the
infringement statutes need not be interpreted as
synonymous with commercial use of the mark. A nonprofit
organization may distribute goods for free, such as donated
food or clothing, or provide noncommercial services, such as
religious services or voter registration services.122 According
to one court, the Lanham Act’s “purpose of reducing
consumer confusion supports application of the Act to

121. E.g., United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 86, 90-93 (stating that courts have
applied the law “to defendants furnishing a wide variety of non-commercial
public and civic benefits” and applying the Lanham Act to a political
organization that used the “United We Stand America” mark for its political
activities and services); Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.
Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that enforcement of a
religious organization’s “Seventh-Day Adventist” and “SDA” marks for religious
goods and services against an unaffiliated church will not violate any
constitutional rights); MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F.
Supp. 869, 874-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying the Lanham Act to use of the “Pink
Panther” mark and paw print design by a gay rights activist group as part of
their logo and rejecting a First Amendment argument); cf. Browne, 612 F. Supp.
2d at 1127, 1131 (holding that Browne could state a claim for false endorsement
based on a presidential candidate’s use of his Running on Empty song in the
background of a political advertisement because the Lanham Act applies to
noncommercial speech).
122. For example, an entity established by a religious organization registered
the mark “Seventh-Day Adventist” for religious books and services, among other
things. Seventh-Day Adventists, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1156, 1158; U.S. Trademark
Reg. No. 1,177,185 (filed May 7, 1980) (issued Nov. 10, 1981). In addition, the
political organization United We Stand America, Inc. obtained a federal
registration for “United We Stand America” as a mark for various services,
including “conducting voter registration drives” and “dissemination of
information in the field of public policy.” U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,844,852
(filed Dec. 7, 1992) (issued July 12, 1994); see also United We Stand, 128 F.3d at
88 (discussing the registration).
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political speech, where the consequences of widespread
confusion as to the source of such speech could be dire.”123
Courts have also applied the infringement provisions of
the Lanham Act to the unauthorized use of marks in the
titles or content of books, magazines, films, and other
artistic and literary works.124 Artistic and literary works are
often sold for profit, but they are not pure commercial
speech, which is defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as
speech that “does no more than propose a commercial
transaction.”125 Some courts use speech-protective doctrines,
such as the Rogers balancing test, to limit the applicability
of trademark infringement law in cases involving artistic
and literary expression.126 These courts do not categorically
hold that infringement law only applies to commercial use
of a mark or expression that qualifies as pure commercial
speech under the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.127
In those circuits where commercial use of a mark is a
requirement for infringement liability, one interesting issue
to consider is whether judges in those circuits will interpret
“commercial use of a mark” more broadly than use of a
mark in commercial speech. To fit a certain harmful use of a
mark within their commercial use requirement, courts may
123. Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
124. E.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1396 (9th Cir. 1997) (book); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d
769, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1994) (magazine); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1979) (film); Am. Dairy Queen
Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728-29 (D. Minn. 1998)
(film).
125. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001); Bd. of Trs.
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74, 482 (1989); Va. State Bd. of
Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (quoting
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
126. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-02 (9th Cir.
2002) (applying the test in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)).
The Rogers balancing test is discussed in detail below. See infra Part II.A.5.b.
127. Id. According to the Second Circuit, “[m]ovies, plays, books, and songs are
all indisputably works of artistic expression and deserve protection.
Nonetheless, they are also sold in the commercial marketplace like other more
utilitarian products, making the danger of consumer deception a legitimate
concern that warrants some government regulation . . . Poetic license is not
without limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, has
a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.” Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.

2010]

BRANDJACKING ON SOCIAL NETWORKS

889

characterize noncommercial use of a mark on a social
network site as commercial even if the mark is not used to
propose a commercial transaction. This may be more likely
to occur if the social network site user provides links to
other commercial websites in posts on the site,128 or makes
money from advertisements displayed alongside the
noncommercial expression on the site.
In trademark disputes involving impersonation of
markholders, courts could also treat the imposter’s
expression as akin to commercial use of the mark because
consumers think the markholder is using the mark on the
social network site for commercial purposes. Markholders
are increasingly providing information about their goods,
services, and commercial activities on official websites and
social network site accounts. Thus, even if the third party
has a noncommercial motive for using the mark to
impersonate the markholder and is not advertising or
selling real commercial goods or services (such as the person
who created the fake Nine West—Model Auditions group
page on Facebook), courts may find this use of the mark is
commercial if reasonable consumers would think the
expression has a commercial purpose.129
Accused infringers will likely argue that a commercial
use requirement for a prima facie trademark infringement
claim better protects speech interests. It may reduce
frivolous lawsuits against individuals who complain about
or parody markholders, discourage courts from applying
trademark infringement law to noncommercial speech, and
make it easier for judges to dismiss speech-harmful
trademark claims early on a motion to dismiss or motion for
summary judgment.130

128. Cf. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d
359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that Doughney used the People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals’ mark PETA in connection with the sale of goods or
services by providing links to 30 commercial websites offering goods or services).
For criticism of this case, see Goldman, Online Word of Mouth, supra note 99, at
416, 419-20.
129. Cf. Tushnet, Facebook Fraud, supra note 12 (“I’m willing to accept that
pretending to offer services in the ordinary market—here, the market for
modeling services—ought to count under these (hopefully unique) facts.”).
130. Ramsey, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 33, at 154-55; Ramsey,
Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 454-56.
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Markholders will likely respond that there are good
reasons for legislatures and courts not to implement such a
rigid categorical rule in infringement actions. These types of
inflexible rules may be unfair to markholders and allow
some confusing uses of marks to continue that would
otherwise be found infringing under the likelihood of
confusion analysis.131 There is a compelling government
interest in protecting consumers against misleading uses of
the marks of political, religious, or other nonprofit groups in
noncommercial expression to falsely designate the source of
the imposter’s own goods, services, or activities.132 Even if
this use of the mark is noncommercial, impersonation of
markholders can significantly harm the public if reasonable
persons believe the false statements of identity and
authorship and rely to their detriment on that expression. If
the speech is noncommercial and the mark is not used to
designate the source of expression, a third party may have a
better argument in favor of categorically excluding this
expression from infringement liability.
4. Trademark Use of the Mark
As discussed earlier, some courts hold that the “use[s]
in commerce” language in §§ 1114(1)(a) or 1125(a)(1)(A)
implicitly limits infringement liability to circumstances
where there is a certain type of “use” of the mark that
satisfies § 1127’s definition of “use in commerce.”133 Other
courts may read a “trademark use” requirement into the
infringement law using other provisions of the Lanham Act.
Section 1127’s definitions of “trademark” and “service mark”
refer to use of a mark “to identify and distinguish” the
person’s goods or services from those of others, “and to
indicate the source” of the person’s goods or services.134
Some courts may use this language to conclude that third
parties are not liable for infringement unless they use the
mark as a trademark or as a designation of source for their
own goods or services.135 Scholars note a threshold
131. Ramsey, Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 457.
132. Id. at 444.
133. See supra note 81.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
135. Professor Goldman advocates such an approach. See Goldman, Online
Word of Mouth, supra note 99, at 418-19 (arguing that “a use in commerce
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trademark use requirement could be used to limit the
expansion of trademark rights and promote competition and
free speech interests, among other societal benefits.136
Unfortunately, this categorical rule may not serve a true
gatekeeper function on motions to dismiss or motions for
summary judgment if courts need to consider consumer
perceptions to decide the question of whether a particular
type of use qualifies as a trademark use.137
Recently, some courts have questioned whether the
Lanham Act contains a separate statutory requirement of
trademark use and have refused to dispose of infringement
claims on this ground on motions to dismiss.138 There is no
explicit “trademark use” requirement in the infringement
statutes, although this concept appears in other parts of the
Lanham Act. For example, the statutory descriptive fair use
defense only applies to the use of a mark “otherwise than as
a mark.”139 Some scholars note this provision would be
superfluous if there were a trademark use requirement for a

should occur only when the defendant uses the plaintiff’s trademark to
designate the source of the defendant’s goods or services” and noting the
definition of a trademark supports this “source-designation requirement”). This
“designation of source” language can be found in the federal dilution statute,
which exempts certain “fair” uses of marks from its application if the mark is
used “other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or
services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006).
136. See, e.g., Barrett, Domain Names, supra note 70, at 983-85; Barrett,
Internet Trademark Suits, supra note 81, at 379, 382-86; Stacey L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 1669, 1674, 1690-98 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding
Trademark Law]; Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark
Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 593-94 (2005) [hereinafter Goldman, Deregulating
Relevancy]; see generally Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The
Historical Foundation for Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses “In the
Manner of a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2008) (arguing common law
and legislative history establish that there is a trademark use limitation in the
infringement provisions of the Lanham Act).
137. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 773, 775-76.
138. See, e.g., Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc. 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 766 & n.7
(N.D. Ill. 2008); Google, Inc. v. Amn. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, No. C O305340 JF, 2005 WL 832398, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
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prima facie claim of infringement.140 Professor McCarthy’s
view is that “[a] requirement of trademark use is implicit in
the requirement that there be a likelihood of confusion for
infringement to occur. Thus, ‘trademark use’ is not a
separate element of plaintiff’s case, but is only one aspect of
the likelihood of confusion requirement for infringement.”141
Despite the potential speech-related benefits of a trademark
use requirement, it could also create some problems,
including a risk that courts will allow socially harmful uses
of marks to continue because the defendant’s particular
type of use does not satisfy this threshold requirement.142
In trademark disputes involving the unauthorized use
of marks in expression on social network sites, accused
infringers will likely argue that trademark use of the mark
is required for infringement liability and this requirement is
not satisfied in these circumstances. If the third party is
using another’s mark only in expression, and not to identify
or distinguish goods or services for sale in the marketplace,
courts in circuits that require trademark use may find there
is no “use in commerce” of the mark as the term is defined
by § 1127 and/or no use of the mark as a “trademark” or
designation of source for goods or services. If the court
concludes that the dissemination of information and other
expression qualifies as a service, however, then third party
use of a mark to designate the source of the expression
could qualify as a trademark use and satisfy any sourcedesignation requirement (although there is still no “use in
commerce” per § 1127 unless the mark is used or displayed
in the sale or advertising of the information services).
140. Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion Over Use, supra note 85, at 1617; Ramsey,
First Amendment Limitations, supra note 33, at 168 n.66. But see Margreth
Barrett, Reconciling Fair Use and Trademark Use, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1, 4-5 (2010) (“[C]onclud[ing] that the trademark use requirement and the fair
use defense are consistent and work together to strike the balance of competing
interests that Congress sought to establish in the Lanham Act.”); Dogan &
Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law, supra note 136, at 1683-85 (arguing the
trademark use requirement does not make the statutory fair use provision
superfluous).
141. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23.11.50, quoted in Vulcan, 552 F. Supp. 2d
at 766 n.7.
142. For the argument that there is no statutory or policy basis for a trademark
use requirement, see generally Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion Over Use, supra
note 85; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark
Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1703 (2007).
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Courts are more likely to find that use of a mark
designates the source of expression on a social network site,
and is a trademark use, where the mark is used in a
username or account name on a social network site to
identify the account and distinguish it from others. This is
especially true if the third party is impersonating the
markholder. If the mark is only used in the content of the
social network site page, and not in the username or
account name, it is unlikely courts will find the mark is
being used to designate the source of the expression.
Examples of such nontrademark uses of a mark include use
in the content of parody, satire, criticism, or other
commentary, use in comparative advertising or news
reporting to refer to the markholder, and use of a
trademarked term to describe the qualities or
characteristics of the defendant’s goods or services rather
than identify their source.143
Finally, it is important to note that even where a mark
is used in a username or account name for a social network
site page, that name may not designate the source of
expression on the site. For example, a fan page for a brand
on a social network site will usually contain posts or
comments from several different people. If the content on
the page indicates the site was created by someone other
than the markholder and the third party who set up the site
does not post comments on the site, that third party is not
using the mark to identify the source or author of
expression on the site. The registrant of the social network
site page is using the mark to describe the content of the
page.
On the other hand, if that third party posts content on
the site under the username or account name, this may
qualify as a trademark use of the mark regardless of
whether the name contains additional words that inform
other users that posts are not authored by the markholder’s
representatives. Words like “fake” or “parody” may notify
others that the markholder is not the source of the
expression, but the username or account name often
indicates the author of any expression posted on the site. In
such circumstances, the markholder may be able to prove
the accused infringer is using the mark as a trademark or
143. Cf. Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits, supra note 81, at 386 (citing cases
where courts declined to find infringement in such circumstances).
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designation of source for expression, but not establish that
this trademark use of the mark causes a likelihood of
confusion.
5. Likelihood of Confusion
If the court determines that the threshold requirements
for infringement liability under §§ 1114(1)(a) or
1125(a)(1)(A) are satisfied, it will next consider whether
consumers are likely to be confused by this use of another’s
mark.144 In trademark cases involving social network sites,
courts may engage in a traditional likelihood of confusion
analysis and/or apply the speech-protective Rogers
balancing test or the speech-harmful initial interest
confusion doctrine. The discussion below will primarily
focus on how these doctrines could be applied in trademark
disputes involving the use of marks solely in expression on
social network sites, and not use of marks in connection
with the advertising or sale of non-informational goods or
services. Current trademark doctrine suggests that courts
are generally more likely to find infringement where the
accused infringer is using the mark to impersonate the
markholder and cause confusion about the source of the
expression. If a reasonable person would not think a page
on a social network site is the markholder’s official page, a
finding of infringement is less likely.
a. Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
When determining whether a likelihood of confusion
exists due to unauthorized use of another’s mark, courts
consider a number of factors. For example, courts in the
Ninth Circuit consider, among other things, the:
(1) strength of the mark, (2) relatedness of the goods or
services, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) evidence of actual
confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) type of goods
and the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers,
(7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and
(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.145 The
discussion below explains how the likelihood of confusion
144. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
145. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); see
also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:39 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
likelihood of confusion test, which was first articulated in Sleekcraft).
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factors may apply in unique ways in disputes involving
social network sites, but readers should note this section
does not provide a comprehensive summary of the law
relating to these factors.146
Strength of the Mark. In his empirical research,
Professor Beebe notes a strong correlation between the
inherent distinctiveness of a mark and a finding by courts of
likelihood of confusion.147 In disputes involving the use of
another’s mark in expression on social network sites,
however, use of a stronger, more distinctive mark—such as
the fanciful mark “Exxon” for gasoline, the arbitrary mark
“Apple” for computers, or the suggestive mark “Tide” for
laundry detergent—will not necessarily increase the
likelihood of confusion caused by this use of the mark. Some
consumers may expect that owners of such well-known
marks have registered the social network site username
consisting of the trademarked term. Yet they may also know
that third parties use such marks in parody, satire,
criticism, and other commentary on social network sites,
and that common words in our language and personal
names are often registered as usernames on a first-come,
first-served basis by someone other than the most famous
markholder.148
If the mark is being used to impersonate the
markholder and falsely identify the source of expression on
a social network site, this use may cause a likelihood of
confusion regardless of whether the mark is an inherently
distinctive mark or a descriptive term with acquired
distinctiveness. On the other hand, if the third party is
clearly parodying, criticizing, or commenting on the
markholder or is using the mark in satire, the fanciful,
arbitrary, or suggestive nature of the mark would not
necessarily increase confusion in these circumstances.
Rather, “the strength of the mark may actually make it
easier for the consumer to realize that the use is a parody”
or other type of commentary.149 The strength of the mark
146. For such a summary, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 24:30-43
(discussing the likelihood of confusion tests in the various circuits).
147. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1636-37 (2006).
148. Cf. Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943-45
(9th Cir. 2002).
149. Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999).
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factor will therefore generally not be a useful measure of
whether consumers are likely to be confused when the mark
is solely used in expression on a social network site rather
than in connection with the advertising or sale of goods or
services.
Relatedness of the Goods or Services / Likelihood
of Expansion of Product Lines. If the parties’ goods or
services are identical or related, courts are more likely to
find a likelihood of confusion.150 In disputes involving the
use of marks only in expression on social network sites,
some courts will likely find this factor favors a finding of no
infringement where the accused infringer is not selling any
goods or services. If the court determines that the
defendant’s dissemination of information qualifies as a
service, however, this factor may favor the markholder if
both parties are using the mark in connection with their
information services.
Yet even if the markholder has only used its mark in
connection with the advertising and sale of its primary
goods or services, the parties’ goods or services need not be
identical or even closely related for courts to find a
likelihood of confusion under §§ 1114(1)(a) or
1125(a)(1)(A).151 Moreover, the markholder can argue it
plans to use its mark in connection with the provision of
information services in the future and thereby expand its
line of products. As discussed in Part I, many brands are
moving beyond traditional advertising in the brick-andmortar world and now provide information to others via
social network sites in addition to official websites and
blogs.
As with the strength of the mark factor, satisfaction of
the relatedness of the goods or services factor (or failure to
satisfy it) may not be an accurate predictor of the likelihood
of confusion in cases involving social network sites. When
the third party is using the mark in parody, satire,
criticism, or other commentary on the site, the fact that the
markholder also provides information services on the
Internet does not make this third party use more or less
confusing. If the accused infringer is instead engaging in
impersonation of the markholder on the site, this use of the
150. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 24:22-50.
151. Id. § 24:22.
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mark may cause significant confusion about the source of
the expression even where the markholder has no presence
on the Internet and the third party does not sell any goods
or services. Moreover, if the markholder has set up an
official social network site page on Facebook, Twitter, or
another site, and consumers already use that site, those
consumers are less likely to believe a different, fake site is
also the official site for that brand even where the
“information services” of the parties are identical. (Of
course, members of the public who have not already used
the markholder’s official social network site may be
confused by an imposter’s site.) For these reasons, the
relatedness of the goods or services factor—along with the
likelihood of expansion of product lines factor—may not be
very useful in evaluating likelihood of confusion when
marks are used without authorization in expression on
social network sites.
Similarity of the Marks. Use of a term identical to
another’s protected mark in the username or account name
of a social network site could increase the likelihood that
consumers will be confused about the source of expression
on that site. But if the accused infringer is using the exact
mark in news reporting, parody, criticism, or commentary
about the markholder, and the content of the page makes it
clear that this third party is responsible for the expression
on the site, then use of the exact mark to refer to the
markholder may not cause any confusion once the user
begins to read the expression on the site. Use of a mark to
refer to the markholder in comparative advertising, or to
describe the goods or services of the third party, also may
not cause confusion even if the third party is using the
identical trademarked term.
Adding words to the mark used in a username or
account name on a social network site could either increase
or decrease consumer confusion depending on the words.
Consumers may be more likely to be confused if the
username or account name that incorporates the mark
includes words like “real” or “official,” and not just the exact
mark. Such words may be used by imposters who are
impersonating the markholder on the site. Confusion is less
likely if words like “fake,” “sucks,” or “victim” appear before
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or after the mark in the name.152 Some third parties clearly
indicate they are engaging in parody or satire, not
impersonation, by including the word “fake” in their name
when they pretend to be someone else on blogs and social
network sites. For example, Dan Lyons became famous for
writing a blog on the Internet under the alias “Fake Steve
Jobs.”153
Actual Confusion. Evidence of actual confusion is not
required for a finding of infringement.154 If it exists,
however, courts may find this use of the mark is more likely
to cause confusion in the future.155 Consumer surveys or
other evidence may show that people believe the expression
on the third party’s social network site page is authored by
the markholder’s representatives. On the other hand, lack
of evidence of any actual confusion by social network site
users for a long period of time may instead contribute to a
finding of no likelihood of confusion.156
Some courts may question whether there is really any
actual confusion that is material if the accused infringer’s
false statements of identity and authorship do not affect the
purchasing decisions of consumers or otherwise cause any
measurable injury.157 Other courts may conclude the actual
152. Cf. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (finding no confusion regarding source when the “Bally” mark was
used in the subdomain compupix.com/ballysucks because it is improbable that
the markholder would use the term “ballysucks”); see also Taubman Co. v.
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding no confusion about the source of
information on websites where domain names contained the word “sucks”).
153. Brad Stone, A Mystery Solved: ‘Fake Steve’ is an Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2007, at C1. Someone has also created a Facebook profile using the name
“Fake Steve Jobs.” Posting of Owen Thomas to Gawker, A Fake Steve Jobs Pops
up on Facebook, http://gawker.com/5070568/a-fake-steve-jobs-pops-up-onfacebook (Oct. 29, 2008, 14:60 PDT); Fake Steve Jobs on Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Fake-Steve-Jobs/6291744229 (last visited June
10, 2010).
154. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:12.
155. Id. §§ 23:13-17. However, Professor Beebe’s empirical research suggests
that “survey evidence, thought by many to be highly influential, is in practice of
little importance.” Beebe, supra note 147, at 1622.
156. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:18.
157. Some courts hold that a Lanham Act plaintiff must prove actual
confusion resulting in actual injury to obtain damages. See, e.g., Web Printing
Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (7th Cir. 1990).
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confusion factor is satisfied as long as consumers are truly
confused about the source of the imposter’s expression. If
social network site users believe the information is coming
directly from the markholder, they may be more likely to
conclude it is accurate and rely on it to their detriment,
especially if the information is negative (such as news of a
product defect or delay, or an illness of the CEO) or contains
details usually only known to insiders.158 Consumers may
sell the markholder’s stock, forgo future employment or
partnership relationships with the markholder, or provide
the imposter with personal information. Unlike confusion
about whether the markholder consented to the third
party’s use of its mark in expression, which should not
constitute actionable confusion per some commentators,159
actual confusion about the source of an imposter’s
expression may cause consumers some real harm, and
justify a presumption of materiality.
One important question in markholder impersonation
cases will be how long the public must be confused by the
false statements of identity and authorship for the court to
find the actual confusion factor satisfied. If the imposter
only confuses the public regarding the source of expression
for a few seconds or minutes, and causes no other confusion,
some courts will likely find this is not sufficient evidence of
actual confusion because any harm caused by this type of
confusion is minimal compared to the harm caused by
confusion that affects purchasing decisions.160 If users do not
discover the deception until after spending a significant
158. Cf. McIntrye v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1995)
(discussing the value of knowing “the identity of the source” for the purpose of
judging the truthfulness of ideas contained in a writing).
159. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 413, 415 (2010) (arguing that trademark infringement law—which includes
a presumption of materiality—should only apply in cases involving actual
source confusion or confusion about whether the markholder is responsible for
the quality of the third party’s goods or services). Professors Lemley and
McKenna contend that trademark law should “refocus on confusion that is
actually relevant to purchasing decisions,” id. at 414, but they do not explicitly
address whether use of a mark to cause actual confusion about the source of
expression should be covered by infringement law where the third party is not
advertising or selling expression that can be purchased by the public.
160. Some courts call this type of confusion “initial interest confusion,” as
discussed later in the Article. See infra Part II.A.5.c (discussing the initial
interest confusion doctrine).
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amount of time reading the expression, then courts may
find this use of the mark to impersonate the markholder is
actually confusing, and is more likely to cause confusion in
the future.
Finally, if an imposter eventually reveals his or her true
identity and is no longer using the mark to impersonate the
markholder, it is unclear whether courts will find the past
actual confusion favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
The disclosure of the prank makes future confusion less
likely.
One example of a later-disclosed impersonation of a
markholder that caused confusion involves “The Yes Men.”
Per their website, The Yes Men are “[i]mpersonating bigtime criminals” on television, at business conferences, and
online “in order to publicly humiliate them”; their past
targets include the World Trade Organization and Exxon.161
In the fall of 2009, The Yes Men used the marks of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) to impersonate this
nonprofit organization on a fake website at the domain
name chamber-of-commerce.us and in fake press releases
that looked official.162 On October 19, 2009, representatives
of The Yes Men held a fake press conference under the
Chamber’s name to announce the organization’s alleged new
position on climate change legislation. The prank was
revealed at the press conference when a real Chamber
representative entered the room and challenged the identity
of the speaker.163 At the time of this writing, there is also no
longer a fake Chamber website at the domain name
chamber-of-commerce.us. In such circumstances, the court
may find the actual confusion factor favors the markholder
and a finding of infringement, but decline to award an

161. The Yes Men, http://www.theyesmen.org/ (last visited June 10, 2010).
162. First Amended Complaint at 7-11, ¶¶ 16, 19-24, Chamber of Commerce of
United States v. Servin, No. 1:09-cv-02014 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 6, 2009), available
at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/yesmen/YESMEN-amendedcomplaint.pdf
[hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Complaint]; Anne C. Mulkern, U.S.
Chamber Sues Activists over Climate Stunt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/10/27/27greenwire-us-chamber-suesactivists-over-climate-stunt-50982.htm.
163. Chamber of Commerce Complaint, supra note 162, at 10-11, ¶¶ 23-25.
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injunction if there is no future risk of actual or lingering
confusion.164
Marketing Channels. Courts generally find that the
likelihood of confusion increases if the parties advertise
their goods or services in similar media, or sell their
products in the same stores. If the accused infringer is not
advertising or selling any goods or services and is simply
using the mark in expression on the social network site,
then courts will likely find the marketing channels factor to
be irrelevant when determining likelihood of confusion.
Both the imposter and markholder may use the Internet to
disseminate information, but it is quite common for
markholders today to have a presence online. In disputes
involving the use of another’s mark in expression that is not
advertised or sold, the marketing channels factor will not be
a good predictor of whether confusion is likely to occur in
these circumstances.
Type of Goods and Degree of Purchaser Care.
Consumers are more likely to be confused by a third party’s
unauthorized use of another’s mark if they do not exercise
care at the time they purchase goods or services. In cases
involving the use of marks solely in expression on social
network sites, some courts may find this factor is irrelevant
because there are no “purchasers” of goods or services.
Yet even if social network site users spend no money,
they do spend valuable time consuming information on
these sites. Moreover, some consumers may be careless
because no money is at stake when they decide to read a
markholder’s posts on its Facebook page or follow the
markholder on Twitter. Other users may spend a significant
amount of time confirming that this social network site page
is official, especially if this relationship results in the
disclosure of the user’s personal information to the
markholder. If a certain social network site is known for
encouraging participants to use their real identities, such as
Facebook, then consumers may exercise less care when
reading the expression on a site that is purportedly
164. See, e.g., SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Rest. LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281,
293-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding infringement because consumers were initially
confused by defendants’ use of the plaintiffs’ logo on the front of a leaflet, but
refusing to grant plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction after noting
there was no risk of actual or lingering confusion once the contents of the leaflet
were examined).
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authored by a markholder. For these reasons, some courts
may still consider this factor in trademark disputes
involving expressive uses of trademarks on social network
sites.
Both sophisticated and clueless users will likely
encounter social network site pages that incorporate
another’s mark and exercise varying degrees of care when
they obtain information on these sites. When the “buyer
class” contains both professional and casual buyers, some
courts hold “the standard of care to be exercised by the
reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the
least sophisticated consumer.”165 If courts apply this rule in
the context of information consumption, then the degree of
purchaser care factor will favor markholders. Even if the
content on a fake page clearly suggests it is a parody, at
least some users new to social network sites or inattentive
readers will likely believe the markholder is the source of
the third party’s expression.
In trademark disputes involving the dissemination of
expression, courts have focused on the standard of care from
the perspective of reasonable people or ordinary consumers
of information with normal intelligence.166 In other contexts
where the First Amendment right of free speech is
implicated, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
reasonable persons must believe the false statement for the
defendant to be liable.167 As noted by the Fourth Circuit, the
judge or jury in a trademark dispute should “determine
whether a likelihood of confusion exists by ‘examin[ing] the
allegedly infringing use in the context in which it is seen by
the ordinary consumer.’”168 This approach better protects the
free flow of information and ideas because a few careless
consumers may be confused by the third party’s expression
for irrational or random reasons.

165. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir.
1991).
166. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201, 204-07 (1st Cir. 1996).
167. See infra Part II.B.
168. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 1992))
(emphasis added in Lamparello).
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Defendant’s Intent. If the plaintiff is able to present
evidence that the defendant is impersonating the
markholder on a social network site with the intent to
deceive the public, this could be determinative on the issue
of likely confusion.169 Professor Beebe’s empirical research
shows a finding of bad intent creates “a nearly unrebuttable presumption of a likelihood of confusion.”170 A
fake social network site account could be set up by a
disgruntled former employee or an unscrupulous competitor
with a bad faith intent to harm the company and malign its
reputation. In such circumstances, some courts will
probably find that the use is likely to confuse consumers.
Individuals with good intentions may also use a
company’s marks in a username or account name of a social
network site to disseminate truthful information about the
company or its products, possibly as a public service or as a
form of self-expression. Despite the accused infringer’s good
faith, the public can still be confused by this use of the mark
if the content of the page suggests that the third party is a
representative of the markholder. A third party’s good faith
may therefore not be a useful predictor of the likelihood of
confusion if that individual does not take steps to reduce
confusion on the social network site page, such as by
indicating his or her actual relationship (or lack thereof)
with the markholder.
* * *
As demonstrated above, in cases involving the
unauthorized use of marks in expression on social network
sites, some of the traditional likelihood of confusion factors
often do not seem to apply and/or do not sufficiently protect
free speech or trademark interests. The next two sections
discuss the common law doctrines created by courts to
address these concerns—specifically, the Rogers balancing
test and the initial interest confusion doctrine—which may
be used by courts in these types of disputes.

169. According to Professor Beebe, “the intent factor, thought by some to be
irrelevant, is of decisive importance.” Beebe, supra note 147, at 1622.
170. Id. at 1628.
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b. The Rogers Balancing Test for Uses of Marks in
Artistic or Literary Works
A social network site user accused of infringement may
argue that the content of his or her social network site page
is akin to an artistic or literary work, and therefore the
speech-protective Rogers balancing test should be used in
lieu of the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis.171 Per
the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, courts should
construe the Lanham Act to apply to artistic or literary
expression “only where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression.”172 The Rogers balancing test was created by the
Second Circuit in a case involving the unauthorized use of
Ginger Rogers’ name in the title of a film—Ginger and
Fred—about two dancers, but it has also been applied by
the Ninth Circuit to allow use of another’s mark in the
content of expression.173
In trademark disputes involving artistic or literary
works, the Rogers balancing test provides that courts should
find First Amendment interests prevail over trademark
rights unless (1) this use of the mark “has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever,” or (2) “if it

171. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900, 901, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2002)
(adopting the Rogers balancing test and finding no infringement of the Barbie
mark when used in the title and content of the band Aqua’s Barbie Girl song).
The Rogers balancing test protects free speech interests in trademark disputes,
but it is more limited than actual First Amendment scrutiny of trademark laws
applied to noncommercial artistic and literary expression. See Ramsey,
Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 445.
172. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
173. See, e.g., E.S.S. Ent. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095,
1099-1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no infringement of the “Play Pen” mark for a
strip club where the third party used “Pig Pen” for the name of a virtual strip
club in a video game). As noted by Professor McCarthy, “courts have expanded
the Rogers balancing approach to encompass all ‘works of artistic expression.’” 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 10:22 (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the test
in a case involving the use of a protected trade dress for the cover of a parody
book)).
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has some artistic relevance, unless [it] explicitly misleads as
to the source or the content of the work.”174
It is likely that some courts will apply this test in
disputes involving the use of marks without authorization
in usernames, account names, and/or the content of social
network site pages. Like an informational website, the
content of a social network site page is generally more like
the content of an artistic or literary work, such as a
magazine, than the content of a label on a can of peas or a
commercial advertisement for the peas. The username or
account name for that page may also be found to be
analogous to the title of a magazine or other expressive
work, as courts have held such an analogy may be
appropriate for certain domain names.175 In Bucci, the court
applied the Rogers balancing test to the unauthorized use of
the “Planned Parenthood” mark in a domain name and
home page address on a website, but it found the defendant
did not satisfy either factor of the test.176 More markholders
and third parties today are disseminating information and
entertainment online via websites and social network site
pages. If this type of content is deemed to be an “artistic or
literary work,” then courts will likely apply the Rogers
balancing test to a third party’s use of another’s mark on a
social network site page that disseminates information or
174. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. For scholarship that discusses this test and
proposes revisions to it, see, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border
Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use
in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt,
Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV.
1011 (2009).
175. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 & n.12
(2d Cir. 2000) (analogizing a domain name to the title of an expressive work,
such as book or movie titles, may be appropriate in some cases); see also Barrett,
Domain Names, supra note 70, at 1009-10 (“In the case of forum websites, the
domain name that identifies the website is analogous to a book, magazine, or
movie title . . . Under the Rogers line of cases, if book, movie and song titles are
fully protected speech, then domain names identifying websites that serve as
forums and do not sell goods or services surely must be too.”).
176. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1430, 1440-41 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“[E]ven treating defendant’s domain name and home page address as titles,
rather than as source identifiers, I find that the title ‘plannedparenthood.com’
has no artistic implications, and that the title is being used to attract some
consumers by misleading them as to the web site’s source or content.”).
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other expression. Some courts may decline to apply this
test, however, if the expression on the social network site is
classified as commercial speech.177
The first factor of the Rogers balancing test is satisfied
if the third party’s use of the mark has some artistic
relevance to the underlying work. Use of another’s mark in
the username, account name, or other content on the site
would clearly be artistically relevant to the entire content of
the social network site page if the expression is about the
markholder. Yet the use may also be relevant for artistic
reasons even if the site does not focus on the markholder or
its products. Per the Ninth Circuit, this factor is satisfied as
long as the work has more than “zero” relevance, which is a
very low standard.178
Under the second factor of the Rogers balancing test,
this use of the mark must also not “explicitly” mislead “as to
the source or the content of the work.”179 This analysis will
require examination of how the mark is used and the
content of the expression, and a determination of what is
actually communicated to consumers by this use of the
mark in the username, account name, or content of the
social network site page. If the mark is used to impersonate
the markholder and people believe the false statements of
identity and authorship due to the content of the page,
courts will likely find this use of the mark explicitly
misleads the public regarding the source and content of the
expression on the social network site.180
On the other hand, if a court examines the content of a
social network site page and determines it clearly contains
parody, satire, criticism, or other commentary, it will likely
find this use of the mark does not explicitly mislead other
users as to the source or content of the expression. Although
it is not required to satisfy the second factor of the Rogers
balancing test, use of a disclaimer or words like “fake” or
“parody” in the username, account name, or content of the
177. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017-18 (3d Cir. 2008)
(declining to apply the Rogers balancing test in a false endorsement case
because the expression—a television production called “The Making of Madden
NFL” that promoted a video game—was deemed to be commercial speech).
178. E.S.S. Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1100.
179. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
180. Cf. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1440-41.
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page may further discourage any notion that the site is
authored by representatives of the markholder. Unless the
third party is impersonating the markholder and falsely
suggesting the markholder is the source of the expression
on the social network site, courts that have adopted the
Rogers balancing test will likely find the public interest in
free expression prevails when marks are used without
authorization in expression on social network sites.
c. The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
In cases involving the unauthorized use of marks to
attract attention on social network sites, markholders will
likely argue that courts should apply the initial interest
confusion doctrine when evaluating an accused infringer’s
liability under the Lanham Act’s infringement provisions.
This doctrine, which is only applied in some circuits,181
provides that “the Lanham Act forbids a competitor from
luring potential customers away from a producer by initially
passing off its goods as those of the producer’s, even if
confusion as to the source of the goods is dispelled by the
time any sales are consummated.”182 According to the Ninth
Circuit, a defendant who uses another’s mark to create
initial interest confusion “improperly benefits from the
goodwill that [the plaintiff] developed in its mark.”183 Under
this theory, use of another’s mark in a manner calculated
“to capture initial consumer attention, even though no
actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion,
may still be an infringement.”184 When applying this
doctrine, courts often focus on the fact that consumers are
confused as to why they are seeing certain content
presented to them, such as an advertisement displayed by
an Internet search engine or a company’s website located at
a particular domain name address.185
181. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:6.
182. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996); see
also Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
183. Brookfield Commc’ns. Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999).
184. Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1405 (9th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted).
185. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th
Cir. 2004); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062-66; see also Goldman, Online Word of
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Accused infringers will likely respond that this doctrine
does not apply to expression on the Internet where the third
party is not advertising or selling any goods or services.
Some courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have refused to
adopt the initial interest confusion doctrine.186 Per the
Fourth Circuit, “[t]he few appellate courts that have
followed the Ninth Circuit and imposed liability under this
theory for using marks on the Internet have done so only in
cases involving . . . one business’s use of another’s mark for
its own financial gain.”187 “Profiting financially from initial
interest confusion is thus a key element for imposition of
liability under this theory.”188 The Third Circuit is similarly
critical of the initial interest confusion doctrine when
applied to parties who are not competitors of the
markholder or where the “confusion has little or no
meaningful effect in the marketplace.”189 Scholars have also
complained that the initial interest confusion doctrine may
stifle expression and competition on the Internet.190
Despite such criticisms of the doctrine, some courts
have found infringement in trademark disputes involving
the dissemination of expression where the confusion did not
affect any purchase decisions and the third party did not
profit financially from its use of the mark. In many of these
types of initial interest confusion cases, however, the
Mouth, supra note 99, at 425 (referring to this type of confusion as “content
source confusion”).
186. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).
187. Id. at 317 (citing PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243,
253 (6th Cir. 2003); Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th
Cir. 2002); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055-56).
188. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 317; see also Hannibal Travis, The Battle for
Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First Amendment Protects
Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. ¶¶ 3, 85
(2005).
189. Checkpoint Sys. Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270,
296-97 (3d Cir. 2001).
190. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 813-31 (2004); Goldman,
Deregulating Relevancy, supra note 136, at 575-95; Michael Grynberg, The Road
Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs, and the
Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (2004); Jennifer E. Rothman,
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005).
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accused infringer used the mark not just to attract attention
to its expression, but also to cause confusion about the
source of the expression.191
For example, both in the brick-and-mortar world and on
the Internet, Planned Parenthood has been the target of
pro-life activists who used its marks to try to confuse
women into learning about their alternate point of view.
Planned Parenthood uses the marks “Planned Parenthood”
and a stylized mark consisting of the letters “PP” (with one
P enclosing the other) for medical and educational services
in the areas of birth control and abortion. In one trademark
dispute, a pro-life group called Problem Pregnancy of
Worcester, Inc. put “PP” on the door of an office on the same
floor as the Planned Parenthood office to intentionally
confuse and intercept women who were seeking Planned
Parenthood’s offices for abortion counseling services.192 A
few years later, pro-life activist Richard Bucci created a
fake Planned Parenthood website at the domain name
plannedparenthood.com, and used the phrase “Welcome to
the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE!” on the
website’s home page.193 The women who entered the pro-life
group’s office and who spent time on Bucci’s website
eventually discovered the pro-life message, but the courts
still found the defendants liable for infringement. It seemed
191. For a discussion of cases involving use by third parties of another’s mark
that may cause trade identity confusion, see 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,
CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 22:2, 22:3
(4th ed. 2010).
192. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of
Worcester, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1044, 1045 (Mass. 1986). The “‘PP’ [was] followed by
smaller letters, ‘Inc. of Worc.’ and then the words: ‘Free pregnancy testing and
counseling, walk-in’ . . . Approximately one foot from the bottom of the door was
the full title ‘Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc.,’ in letters measuring about
one-half inch.” Id. “According to the affidavits of three women, on separate
occasions, each entered 340 Main Street on her way to have either a pregnancy
test or an abortion at PPLM and by mistake entered the offices of PP, Inc. There
the women conversed with staff members and filled out medical history forms
before realizing they were at the wrong place. They were distressed over this
confusion and complained to PPLM. Their claims triggered the present action.”
Id. at 1045-46.
193. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1430, 1432 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998). The
website also included a scanned image of the cover of the book The Cost of
Abortion which linked to passages from the book. Id.

910

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

important to these decisions that the defendants used
Planned Parenthood’s marks to intentionally confuse
women seeking the markholder’s services and information
into hearing or reading their own pro-life message.194
Like the Bucci court, other courts have found certain
uses of the marks of nonprofit organizations in domain
names linked to informational websites to be infringing
even though the defendant was not selling or advertising
commercial goods or services. For example, in Jews for
Jesus v. Brodsky, the defendant used a religious
organization’s “Jews for Jesus” mark in the domain name
jewsforjesus.org and an unofficial website about this
religious group.195 The court held this use of the mark was
likely to cause confusion among Internet users who were
looking for the official Jews for Jesus website.196 As in Bucci,
the Jews for Jesus defendants admitted they used the
plaintiff’s mark because they wanted to intercept members
of the public interested in the markholder’s message.197
In addition, the Southern District of New York recently
found infringement under the initial interest confusion
doctrine where a trademark was used without authorization
on the front of a leaflet to cause confusion about the identity
of the author of the message contained therein. In SMJ
Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, a nonprofit
organization that promotes the rights of restaurant workers
distributed leaflets that displayed the plaintiffs’
trademarked logo on the cover with the phrase “SPECIAL
FOR YOU” in front of two of plaintiffs’ restaurants.198 Inside
194. Id. at 1433 (“Defendant’s counsel also admitted that Bucci was trying to
reach Internet users who thought, in accessing his web site, that they would be
getting information from plaintiff . . . [D]efendant’s motive in choosing plaintiff’s
mark as his domain name was, at least in part, to attract to his home page
Internet users who sought plaintiff’s home page.") (emphasis in original);
Problem Pregnancy, 498 N.E.2d at 1049, 1053 (affirming injunction because
defendant’s intent was to confuse women in order to further its goals).
195. 993 F. Supp. 282, 290, 301-05 (D.N.J. 1998), aff’d 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir.
1998).
196. Id.
197. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433; Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308
(“[Defendant] has created, in his words, a ‘bogus “Jews for Jesus”’ site intended
to intercept, through the use of deceit and trickery, the audience sought by the
Plaintiff Organization.”).
198. 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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the leaflet, a message critical of the plaintiffs appeared
alongside the phrase “DO YOU REALLY WANT TO EAT
HERE?”199 The parties agreed that recipients of the leaflet
would initially think the plaintiffs were the source of the
message, but would realize the leaflet was not associated
with the markholder upon opening it because of the critical
message.200 Although the court thought it was admirable
that “[d]efendants seek to educate the public,” it concluded
that defendants’ use of the plaintiffs’ logo on the front of the
leaflet was infringing and explained that “an individual
being educated should not be misled about the source of
that education, just as an individual purchasing a can of
peas should not be misled about the source of those peas.”201
The court held that the doctrine of initial interest confusion
was not limited to use of another’s mark by a business for
its own financial gain,202 and could be applied in this case to
the defendants’ use of the plaintiffs’ mark in noncommercial
expression.203
Courts and commentators have criticized the Bucci,
Jews for Jesus, and SMJ Group decisions for a variety of
reasons, including the potential harm to free speech
interests if courts find infringement without considering
whether the content of the message dispels confusion about
the source of the message.204 In some circuits, accused
199. Id.
200. Id. at 288.
201. Id. at 287.
202. Id. at 289 (quoting Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 317 (4th Cir.
2005)).
203. Id. at 288-91. The court held that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their
infringement claim, and rejected a First Amendment defense because
defendants used the “marks as a source identifier.” Id.
204. See, e.g., Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 318 n.6 (“[B]oth [the Bucci and Jews for
Jesus] cases were wrongly decided to the extent that in determining whether the
domain names were confusing, the courts did not consider whether the websites’
content would dispel any confusion. In expanding the initial interest confusion
theory of liability, these cases cut if off from its moorings to the detriment of the
First Amendment.”); Jon H. Oram, Note, The Costs of Confusion in Cyberspace,
107 YALE L.J. 869 (1997) (discussing Bucci); Posting of Eric Goldman to
Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Trademark Travesty of the Month—SMJ
Group
v.
417
Lafayette
Restaurant,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2006/07/trademark_trave.htm (July 13, 2006, 12:05); supra note 190
(listing scholarship critical of the initial interest confusion doctrine).
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infringers may be able to avoid a finding of infringement
under the initial interest confusion doctrine or the
traditional likelihood of confusion test if the underlying
content of the social network site page dispels any potential
confusion about the source of the expression.205 For example,
in Lamparello v. Falwell, Reverend Jerry Falwell sued
Christopher Lamparello after he set up a website at the
domain name fallwell.com that was critical of the religious
leader and his “untruths about gay people.”206 On the home
page, Lamparello prominently included the disclaimer
“[t]his website is NOT affiliated with Jerry Falwell or his
ministry” and provided a link to Reverend Falwell’s actual
website.207 After examining the content of the website, the
Fourth Circuit found there was no likelihood of confusion
caused by this use of the religious leader’s trademarked
name (with an extra “l”) in the domain name.208
The First Circuit also found no likelihood of confusion
after considering the content of the expression when it
evaluated the infringement claims in International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Winship
Green Nursing Center.209 In this case, an employer
attempting to defeat a union organizing campaign used the
marks of the union in fake flyers, letters, and invoices that
purported to come from the union and disseminated these
fictitious documents to employees.210 The court found this
expression was not likely to cause confusion because the
employees could readily identify the employer as the source
of the message upon reading the content of the message.
According to the court, no reasonable employee would be
confused about the source of the materials after reading the
content.211
205. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 316 n.4, 318 (citing Parks v. LaFace Records, 329
F.3d 437, 452-54 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894, 900-02 (9th Cir. 2002); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214
F.3d 658, 667-68 (5th Cir. 2000); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
206. Id. at 311.
207. Id. at 314-18.
208. Id.
209. 103 F.3d 196, 198-99, 207 (1st Cir. 1996).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 201-02, 205-07.
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In cases involving alleged impersonation of markholders
on social network sites, courts may balance the trademark
rights of markholders, the public’s interest in avoiding
confusion and in being able to trust the accuracy of
statements of identity and authorship, the free speech
rights of third parties to use another’s mark to express
themselves, and the right of the audience to receive that
expression. Courts are more likely to find infringement if
reasonable people are truly confused about the source of the
accused infringer’s expression, and the content of the social
network site page does not dispel that confusion. Yet if the
mark is just used to attract attention to expression on a
social network site, and there is no confusion about its
source, a finding of infringement is unlikely where the third
party is not advertising or selling goods or services.
6. Fair Use
Even if the markholder can establish a prima facie case
of infringement, the accused infringer may argue this use of
the mark in the username, account name, or content of the
social network site page is justified under the descriptive
fair use or nominative fair use doctrine. Under the Lanham
Act, it is a defense to infringement to “use, otherwise than
as a mark,” a word or phrase “which is descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or
services of [a] party, or their geographic origin.”212 For
example, the Second Circuit found a competitor’s use of the
phrase “Seal it with a Kiss!!” in promotional displays for
lipstick was a descriptive fair use of another company’s
registered mark “SEALED WITH A KISS” for lip gloss.213
Some courts may find a descriptive use of another’s
trademarked term in the content of a social network site
page to describe the third party’s goods or services to be an
acceptable fair use of the mark. If the trademarked
descriptive term is used in the username or account name,
however, and the name identifies the source of expression
by this third party on the social network site, the court may
conclude this is a “trademark use” of the term, and not a use
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 11:45-49.
213. Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28
(2d Cir. 1997).
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“otherwise than as a mark.”214 Moreover, in cases involving
impersonation of markholders it will be difficult to establish
a descriptive fair use defense because courts will likely find
that an imposter who is intentionally pretending to be the
markholder to confuse the public is not using the mark
“fairly and in good faith” and/or is not using the mark to
describe that party’s own goods or services.
Nominative fair use is a common law doctrine adopted
in some circuits that permits third parties to use another’s
mark without authorization to refer to the markholder or its
goods or services.215 An example is a newspaper’s use of the
trademark of the musical group “New Kids on the Block” in
a survey to ask readers to vote for their favorite member of
the band.216 For the nominative fair use doctrine to apply,
the accused infringer must prove (1) the markholder’s goods
or services are not readily identifiable without use of the
mark, (2) the third party has only used so much of the mark
as is reasonably necessary to identify the markholder’s
goods or services, and (3) the third party has not done
anything that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the markholder.217
If the accused infringer is using the mark in parody,
criticism, or other commentary about the markholder on the
social network site, including in news reporting or
comparative advertising, it will likely be able to satisfy the
first factor. Commentators generally need to use another’s
mark to identify the target or subject of their expression.
The second factor is more likely to be met if the third party
214. Cf. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 103-04 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that the “The Children’s Place” mark for clothing was used
“as a mark” in the domain name thechildrensplace.com for a website and thus
the statutory fair use defense did not apply).
215. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:11.
216. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304 (9th
Cir. 1992).
217. Id. at 308; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792,
810-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding use of the trademarked Barbie doll in parody
photographs was nominative fair use); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d
1139, 1150–55 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding use of the trademarked name and
likeness of Princess Diana in memorabilia and ads was nominative fair use). A
variation of this common law doctrine has been developed and applied in the
Third Circuit. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d
211, 217–21 (3d Cir. 2005).
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only uses non-stylized word marks to identify the
markholder. Some courts may find it is unnecessary to use
the stylized version of the mark or trademarked logos on the
social network site page. Satisfaction of the last factor will
likely depend on whether the third party is impersonating
the markholder or is using the mark to communicate about
the markholder. If the content of the social network site
page confuses consumers about the source of the expression,
the imposter will not be able to claim this is a permissible
nominative fair use of the mark. On the other hand, where
the social network site user is simply using the mark in
parody, criticism, or commentary about the markholder,
courts will likely find this is a nominative fair use of the
mark if the content clearly indicates the third party is the
source of the expression.
B. A First Amendment Defense
In addition to attacking a trademark infringement
claim on doctrinal grounds, an accused infringer may also
argue that this expression on the social network site is
protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. Some courts may decide to independently
evaluate the constitutionality of the infringement statutes
as applied to this expression on the social network site,
especially if the speech is noncommercial. In trademark
cases involving noncommercial speech that is not
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection,
application of trademark law to that expression is only
constitutional if the law is narrowly tailored and is the least
restrictive means to promote a compelling government
interest. Few laws survive such strict scrutiny analysis.218
A full constitutional analysis of infringement law
regulating the use of marks in different types of expression
on social network sites is beyond the scope of this Article. It
is possible to conclude, however, that a First Amendment
defense could prevail in trademark cases involving
noncommercial speech on social network sites in many, but
not all, of these disputes. Trademark infringement law is
unlikely to survive strict constitutional scrutiny where the
218. See generally Ramsey, Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 389, 421-47
(discussing the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine and explaining how
it should be used to evaluate the constitutionality of federal trademark laws).
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accused infringer is not advertising or selling goods or
services and that person’s noncommercial expression does
not contain false statements of fact. On the other hand,
some courts could reject a First Amendment defense in
trademark cases involving noncommercial expression, and
find application of infringement law to be constitutional,
where the accused infringer is using the mark on the social
network site to impersonate the markholder and reasonable
persons believe the third party’s false statements of identity
and authorship.219
A person may effectively communicate certain ideas or
information by impersonating a markholder on a social
network site.220 This prank may grab the attention of the
public more than traditional means of communication, and
make everyone more likely to focus on the underlying
message. But just because a particular method of
communication is effective in achieving its goal does not
mean that the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. When an imposter uses another’s mark to say
“I am the markholder” and disseminate information on a
social network site purporting to come from the markholder,
this individual is falsely claiming to be the markholder’s
representative. This expression is not constitutionallyprotected anonymous speech or pseudonymous speech.221 It
219. Cf. id. at 444 (“[T]rademark infringement laws banning the misleading
use in noncommercial speech of the distinctive marks of political, religious, or
other noncommercial groups could satisfy strict scrutiny analysis if the marks
were used by the defendant as marks to falsely designate the source of its
activities. Protecting the ability of consumers to identify and distinguish among
the activities of noncommercial entities is a compelling government interest. If
these laws are narrowly tailored to protect expression and the least restrictive
means to further this interest, they should be found constitutional.”).
220. For an argument that parody blogs are protected by the First
Amendment, see Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to
Digital Media as a First Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1530-43
(2007).
221. For a discussion of the law relating to anonymous and pseudonymous
speech, see generally David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on
Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139 (proposing reforms to the law in the context of cyberspace); Ken D.
Kumayama, Note, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427 (2009) (same).
There is a First Amendment right to speak anonymously. See Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-67 (2002);
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199-200 (1999);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995); Talley v.
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is a knowingly false statement of fact. Per the U.S. Supreme
Court, “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless;
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an
individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by
counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”222
Some false statements about a markholder may be
protected speech depending on the circumstances. Under
the law of defamation, “public figures . . . may recover for
injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that
the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”223 When an
individual impersonates a markholder on a social network
site, however, he or she knows these statements of identity
and authorship are false. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
has rejected a First Amendment defense in a defamation
case involving false attribution of expression to an
individual. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,224
psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson sued a writer, magazine, and
book publisher for libel when the writer made up quotes and
attributed them to Masson in a magazine article. The Court
noted that reasonable persons would believe the quotations
were nearly verbatim reports of statements made by
Masson, and thus held the fabricated quotations could
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960). This right, however, is not absolute and
may be limited by defamation law and other laws. See Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942).
222. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 338, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (stating that falsehoods do not materially advance society’s interest in
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues); Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572 (“[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”).
223. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (“[Plaintiff
must] prove[] that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.”). The test is whether there is “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
224. 501 U.S. 496, 499-508 (1991).
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“giv[e] rise to a conceivable claim of defamation.”225 If the
First Amendment does not prevent a plaintiff from pursuing
a defamation claim based on a false attribution of
expression in such circumstances, courts may also find it is
constitutional to allow a markholder to pursue a trademark
infringement claim when reasonable persons are confused
by a third party’s use of a mark to impersonate a
markholder on a social network site.
Some courts have refused to recognize a First
Amendment right to use another’s mark to cause confusion
about the source of the third party’s expression. For
example, in SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant
LLC, the Southern District of New York held that
defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ logo as a source identifier on
the front of leaflets was not protected by the First
Amendment.226 According to the court, “[t]he First
Amendment protects an individual’s right to speak out
against a markholder, but it does not permit an individual
to suggest that the markholder is the one speaking.”227
However, the court declined plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction for a variety of reasons, including
the fact that there was no proof of irreparable harm, no risk
of actual or lingering confusion once the contents of the
leaflet were examined, and a concern that an injunction
would be a prior restraint of speech.228 In Coca-Cola
225. Id. at 510-14, 519. In the Hustler v. Falwell libel dispute, there was a
similar focus on whether the defendant’s false statements about the plaintiff
were “reasonably believable.” See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 (accepting the jury’s
finding that the Hustler ad parody about Falwell was not “reasonably
believable” and could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts
about [Falwell] or actual events in which [he] participated”). In Masson, the
Court explained that “[a] fabricated quotation may injure reputation in at least
two senses, either giving rise to a conceivable claim of defamation. First, the
quotation might injure because it attributes an untrue factual assertion to the
speaker. An example would be a fabricated quotation of a public official
admitting he had been convicted of a serious crime when in fact he had not. [¶]
Second, regardless of the truth or falsity of the factual matters asserted within
the quoted statement, the attribution may result in injury to reputation because
the manner of expression or even the fact that the statement was made
indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not hold.”
Masson, 501 U.S. at 511.
226. 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285-86, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
227. Id. at 291.
228. Id. at 293-95.
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Company v. Purdy, the defendant Purdy “linked the domain
names my-washingtonpost.com and drinkcoke.org to a
website displaying what appeared to be a front page
originating from washingtonpost.com” and included a
headline that said “The Washington Post proclaims
Abortion is Murder.”229 According to the Eighth Circuit,
“Purdy has the right to express his message over the
Internet,” but “he has not shown that the First Amendment
protects his appropriation of plaintiffs’ marks in order to
spread his protest message by confusing Internet users into
thinking that they are entering one of the plaintiffs’
websites.”230
Impersonating a markholder may be an effective way to
attract attention to expression on a social network site, but
this use of the mark may not be protected speech if it causes
ordinary consumers to be confused about the source of the
expression. Courts may find that knowingly false
statements of identity and authorship are only entitled to
First Amendment protection if reasonable persons would
not believe the statements to be truthful, such as a clear
parody impersonation of a markholder.231 The First
Amendment is implicated when trademark laws regulate
protected expression, but trademark laws are still
constitutional if a categorical exception applies to that
speech or the law satisfies constitutional scrutiny.232
III. PROPOSAL TO FOCUS THE INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS ON
IMPERSONATION WHEN MARKS ARE USED IN NONCOMMERCIAL
EXPRESSION ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES
When usernames and account names on social network
sites become the identity of the person who posts content to
the site, these names generally communicate more
information about the source of expression than Internet
domain names for websites or the titles of traditional
artistic or literary works. If a third party incorporates the
trademark of another into a username or account name and
impersonates the markholder, this may cause consumers to
229. 382 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).
230. Id. at 787-88.
231. Cf. Masson, 501 U.S. at 512-13, 519; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57.
232. Ramsey, Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 389, 421-47.
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become confused regarding the author of the expression
posted by that user on the social network site. Reasonable
persons may think it is the markholder’s representative, not
some random individual, who is communicating with them.
At the same time, many unauthorized uses of trademarks
on these sites will not cause any consumer confusion. If
social network sites respond to complaints of infringement
by automatically removing all allegedly infringing uses of
marks to protect themselves from contributory liability, this
will stifle the free flow of information and ideas on these
sites.
Markholders may not complain when a social network
site user mentions in a post on Facebook or a tweet on
Twitter that she spilled Coke on her new dress, bought
Exxon stock, or thought her brother’s new girlfriend
reminded her of Barbie. Yet they may object to the use of
their marks in the username, account name, or the content
of a social network site page that parodies, criticizes, or
otherwise comments on the markholder. Popular brands
may want to prevent competitors from using their marks in
comparative advertising about the cost or quality of
competing products. Some brands may want to control all
uses of their marks in expression on social network sites. A
social network site may have a difficult time deciding what
to do if, for example, a markholder demanded removal of
posts similar to the following tweets by Coca-Cola on its
Twitter account in March 2009 that included the Pepsi and
Mentos marks with links to articles on the Internet:
(1) “Rum and pepsi just isn’t right”; (2) “Drink of choice for
Obama administration? COKE—not pepsi!”; and (3) “Coke
Geyser—Diet Coke+Mentos=ERUPTION!”233
233. Coca-Cola on Twitter, http://twitter.com/cocacolaco (Mar. 23, 2009, 08:18)
(posting “Rum and pepsi just isn’t right” and including a link to an article about
the fact that Atlanta airline Delta is considering serving Pepsi products in
addition
to
Coke
on
its
flights);
Coca-Cola
on
Twitter,
http://twitter.com/cocacolaco (Mar. 12, 2009, 12:29) (posting “Drink of Choice for
Obama Administration? COKE—not pepsi!” and including a link to a news
article reporting that several senior level officials in the Administration are
“committed cola drinkers”); Coca-Cola on Twitter, http://twitter.com/cocacolaco
(Mar. 9, 2009, 16:46) (posting “Coke Geyser—Diet Coke+Mentos=ERUPTION!”
and including a link to a related Wikipedia article). Note that these posts were
to an old Coca-Cola Twitter account located at http://twitter.com/cocacolaco,
which was closed on July 31, 2009 and moved to a new account located at
http://twitter.com/cocacola.
See
Coca-Cola
on
Twitter,
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If a markholder files a complaint with a social network
site that has a notice-and-takedown procedure and alleges
that a user has engaged in trademark infringement, will
that site permit such expressive uses of the trademarks of
others, or remove this content and/or terminate the
accounts of users who are the subject of such complaints?
Social network sites should balance free speech and
trademark interests when they decide whether to allow or
remove the allegedly infringing material. They will have to
predict how courts will apply trademark infringement and
free speech law to certain unauthorized uses of trademarks
on these sites. This will be difficult under current law.
As discussed in Part II, most courts will likely find the
mark is used “in commerce” in a trademark dispute if the
social network site is accessible on the Internet. If the
accused infringer is not using the mark to advertise or sell
goods or services, however, some courts may decline to find
infringement because there is no “use in commerce” of the
mark, as that phrase is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127. For the
use in connection with goods, services, or commercial
activities element of an infringement claim, it is unclear
whether courts will conclude that dissemination of
expression is a service, or hold that free speech interests are
better served by a narrow interpretation of the term
“services.” In some circuits, courts may also protect the free
flow of information and ideas by requiring commercial
and/or trademark use of the mark for infringement liability.
Other courts may decline to adopt one or more these
threshold requirements, and focus on whether this
expressive use of the mark is likely to cause confusion or
qualifies as a fair use of the mark.
When third parties use marks without authorization
but do not advertise or sell goods or services, free speech
interests will be better protected if courts and social
network sites determine that those users are not providing
information services, or conclude there is a threshold use in
commerce, commercial use, or trademark use requirement
that is not satisfied. These bright-line rules would make it
easier for trial courts to dispose of frivolous, speech-harmful
trademark infringement claims on motions to dismiss or
summary judgment. Such rules will also provide better
http://twitter.com/cocacolaco (July 25, 2009, 17:51) (“We will be closing this
account on July 31—please follow us over at our new location”).
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guidance to social network sites trying to determine
whether to remove allegedly infringing content. Yet such
categorical speech-protective rules may permit certain uses
of trademarks that are harmful to the public and
markholders, including use of another’s mark to
impersonate a markholder and cause confusion about the
source of expression.
Protection of trademarks against such confusion can
reduce consumer search costs.234 Markholders use
trademarks as statements of identity and authorship, and
the marks enable us to quickly and easily identify and
distinguish among different types of expression competing
for our attention. Just as consumers rely on marks to
indicate the source or quality of shoes or travel services,
they may rely on usernames, account names, or headings in
the content of a social network site page to communicate
information about the identity of the author of expression
on the site.235 A person who encounters multiple social
network site pages for a particular markholder may find it
difficult to find the “real” or “official” site when they search
for it.236
If the content of a social network site page suggests it is
authored by the markholder, users will be required to
engage in additional research to determine if the expression
234. The standard economic arguments for protecting trademarks include the
benefit of reduced consumer search costs and the creation of incentives for
markholders to maintain and improve product quality. See Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d
509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 173 (2003); Robert
G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2101,
2105-08 (2004).
235. Cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The
purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, has a right not to be
misled as to the source of the product.”); Heymann, Birth of the Authornym,
supra note 35, at 1382-83 (“[T]he values that trademark law promotes . . . are
equally valid goals when the ‘customer’ shops in the marketplace of ideas.”).
Professor Heymann suggests an infringement-like action should be available to
an author when a third party brands a piece of writing with the name of a wellknown author who is not in fact its source. Heymann, Birth of the Authornym,
supra note 35, at 1433.
236. See Lee, supra note 1, at B2 (“Put Nike in the search Twitter box and it
returns 175 results, with none of them clearly the global sporting brand’s official
account.”).
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is truly written by the markholder’s representatives, and
not an imposter. On the other hand, the content of the page
can also reduce or eliminate confusion about its source. As
discussed previously, the nature of the content (parody,
satire, criticism, or other commentary), a prominent
disclaimer, or words like “fake” or “parody” can indicate the
markholder is not the author of this expression. Even if the
third party is pretending to be the markholder, the content
of the expression may be so outrageous or different than
past communications of the markholder that reasonable
persons are unlikely to think it is actually written by the
markholder’s representatives. While consumers of
information should be able to use trademarks to identify
and distinguish among competing sources of expression on
social network sites, courts and social network sites should
not deem a certain use of a mark to be infringing without
considering the content of the information disseminated
under that mark and how that content is understood by
reasonable consumers of information on these sites.237
To protect both trademark and free speech interests,
this Article proposes that infringement law should apply to
the unauthorized use of a mark on a social network site that
is likely to cause confusion about the source of expression
unrelated to the advertising or sale of goods or services, but
only where (1) the mark is used to impersonate the
markholder and falsely suggest the markholder is the
author of the third party’s expression, (2) reasonable people
believe the imposter’s false statements of identity and
authorship, and (3) the content of the social network site
page does not dispel the confusion regarding the source of
237. Cf. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 512-13, 519
(1991) (finding a reasonable reader would believe the false statement of
attribution); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (accepting
the jury’s finding that the ad parody was not reasonably believable); Lamparello
v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 318 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that courts must look at
the underlying content of the website linked to an allegedly infringing domain
name); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201-02, 205-07 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding no
infringement because employees would know the employer, not the union, was
the author of the expression after reviewing the content of the fake documents
bearing the union’s marks), discussed in United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United
We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting the fact that
the content dispelled confusion regarding source in the International case is
critical to the decision).
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the expression.238 Courts would apply this three-part test
only after they determined that the markholder had met all
of the threshold requirements for a prima facie
infringement claim and established this unauthorized use of
the mark is likely to cause confusion regarding the source of
the expression. If the third party is not advertising or
selling any goods or services on the social network site and
consumers are only confused about whether the markholder
authorized this use of its mark or is affiliated with or
sponsors the third party’s expression, this expressive use of
the mark should be outside of the scope of the trademark
infringement laws.
This test attempts to balance trademark and free
speech interests in different ways. It allows markholders to
protect themselves against impersonation on social network
sites and prevent confusion about the source of expression
falsely attributed to the markholder. Yet it does not allow
markholders to use trademark infringement law to suppress
unauthorized uses of their marks that only cause confusion
about whether the markholder consented to this use.239
Unlike this latter type of confusion, consumer confusion
about the source of expression can cause real harm to the
public and markholders if the public relies on false or
misleading information provided by the imposter. Under the
test, use of another’s mark solely to attract the attention of
social network site users should not alone justify a finding
238. Focusing on whether a reasonable person would be confused by the
content of a fake account may currently be the approach used by some social
network sites in deciding whether to remove the allegedly infringing content.
See, e.g., Marie Price, Is Your Trademark in Jeopardy?, J. REC., June 16, 2009,
at B1 (“Twitter . . . allows users to establish ‘parody’ impersonation accounts.
‘They use a standard of, if an ordinary person would look at that and know the
account is a joke account, Twitter will allow it[.]’”) (quoting McAfee & Taft
attorney Ryan Lobato). Although it may be difficult to determine the
characteristics of the “reasonable person” in trademark law, courts already
make this determination when they conduct the likelihood of confusion analysis.
See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 781 (2008).
239. Some courts have found infringement where the main type of confusion
was about whether the markholder consented to this use of its mark in the
expression. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 77273 (8th Cir. 1994); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th
Cir. 1987); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1979).
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of infringement if there is no impersonation of the
markholder. Some free riding on the goodwill in the marks
of popular brands may benefit consumers if the mark is
used to convey information or ideas. Unauthorized use of a
competitor’s mark in expression on a social network site
would still be actionable under this proposal if it causes a
likelihood of confusion and affects purchasing decisions, yet
the lack of similarity of the parties’ goods or services or the
noncommercial nature of the expression would not prevent
a finding of infringement.240
Free speech advocates may complain that this test does
not sufficiently protect speech interests. It is true that less
speech will be chilled or suppressed on social network sites
if there is a categorical free speech right to use trademarks
in noncommercial expression to convey information or ideas.
Such a rule would make it easier for commentators and
pranksters to predict, and for courts and social network
sites to decide, whether a particular use of a mark is
protected speech or an infringing impersonation.
Yet there are good policy reasons not to adopt such a
rigid threshold commercial use requirement that would
apply in every trademark dispute. As discussed in Part I,
consumers of noncommercial expression on social network
sites can be harmed in various ways by a confusing
impersonation of a markholder. This unauthorized use of
the mark may cause members of the public to stop buying
the markholder’s goods or services, sell their stock, forgo
employment or partnerships with the company, or send
photos and personal contact information to an imposter,
among other things. Trademark infringement law should
protect consumers from the harm caused by the confusing
use of marks to falsely designate the source of
noncommercial expression. Congress and the courts could
prevent such harms and protect speech interests by instead
adopting an exemption from liability for nontrademark uses
of a mark in noncommercial expression.241 Regardless of
whether such an exemption is adopted, this Article proposes
that noncommercial use of a mark in expression on a social
240. Professor McKenna suggests that courts should treat the similarity of the
goods as a threshold issue in infringement actions. Mark P. McKenna, Testing
Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 115-16 (2009).
241. Ramsey, First Amendment Limitations, supra note 33, at 155-56; Ramsey,
Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 455-56.
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network site can be actionable infringement, but only if the
content of the expression causes reasonable persons to be
confused about the source of that expression.
Criticism of this proposal may also come from the other
side. Some advocates of strong trademark protection may
argue this proposal improperly puts a thumb on the scale in
favor of free speech interests in trademark disputes
involving the unauthorized use of marks in expression on
social network sites. As product placement is popular today
in artistic and literary works, unauthorized use of a mark in
expression on social network sites may cause confusion
about whether the markholder gave permission for its mark
to be used in this way.242 Even if this is true, the
infringement statutes do not require courts to adopt such a
maximalist view of trademark rights and prohibit all
unauthorized uses of marks that cause some type of
confusion. The First Amendment right to freedom of
expression requires courts to interpret the trademark
infringement statutes narrowly to protect free speech
interests.243 There is no evidence that Congress intended
confusion about consent to use a mark in expression to be
actionable confusion under trademark infringement law.
Markholders may also say this proposal should be
rejected because it is more lenient than the Rogers
balancing test for uses of marks in artistic or literary works.
As discussed above, that test requires the third party’s use
of the mark to have some “artistic relevance to the
underlying work” and not explicitly mislead as to the source
or content of the work.244 Courts applying this proposal
could permit uses of marks on social network sites that are
not “artistically relevant” to the expression or that cause
confusion about the content of the work, as the proposal
focuses on confusion about the source of expression.
It is true that this proposal is more speech-protective
than the Rogers balancing test, but it does not tip the
balance too far in favor of accused infringers. It is
troublesome from a free-speech perspective if courts are
determining whether certain expression on a social network
242. Cf. Gulasekaram, supra note 174, at 940-41 (discussing the potential
arguments of markholders in cases involving artistic and literary works).
243. Ramsey, Increasing Scrutiny, supra note 32, at 447-53.
244. See supra Part II.A.5.b.
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site page is “artistically relevant,” as their biases may
improperly influence this determination. In addition, any
confusion about the content of the social network site page
will be dispelled by viewing or reading the expression.
Confusion regarding source is potentially more harmful
than confusion regarding content because social network
site users may still be confused about the source of the
expression even after consuming the content on the page.
Unless there is a disclaimer or words like “fake” or “parody”
in the content, the content may not eliminate the sourceconfusion caused by this unauthorized use of the mark. For
all of these reasons, source confusion should be the main
focus of the infringement analysis in cases involving
expressive uses of marks on social network sites.
Finally, critics may argue that trademark law does not
apply to confusion about the source of expression because
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Dastar Corporation v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation that trademark
law is not concerned with attribution of expression.245 Yet in
Dastar, the third party used its own name on the
markholder’s expression (which was in the public domain
and no longer protected by copyright), not the other way
around.246 As discussed in Part II, news organizations like
The New York Times Company can obtain trademark rights
in their marks which are enforceable against imposters who
use the mark in connection with the sale of their own
expression. Using another’s mark to impersonate a
markholder and confuse consumers regarding the source of
245. 539 U.S. 23, 31-32 (2003).
246. The court concluded the phrase “origin of goods” in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(A) refers to “the producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace, in this case the physical . . . videotape sold by Dastar” and not “the
person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’
embody or contain.” Id. at 31-32. For an excellent discussion and criticism of the
case, see Heymann, Birth of the Authornym, supra note 35; Laura A. Heymann,
The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 62 (2007) (“[P]ropos[ing]:
a recognition of the attribution interest in communicative goods during both the
term of copyright and in the public domain, coupled with greater scrutiny of
trademark-based claims masquerading as copyright-based ones.”). Some
commentators note the Court’s interpretation of the meaning of the statute may
be limited to the phrase “origin of goods.” See, e.g., Rick Mortensen, D.I.Y. After
Dastar: Protecting Creators’ Moral Rights Through Creative Lawyering,
Individual Contracts and Collectively Bargained Agreements, 8 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 335, 342 (2006).
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your expression is very different than affixing your own
mark to someone else’s expression (which may be protected
by copyright) and removing their mark, which is what
happened in Dastar. In the trademark disputes discussed in
this Article, the plaintiff’s expression is not at issue; the
third party, not the markholder, is the author of the
expression. For this reason, the analysis and holding in
Dastar are irrelevant to trademark disputes involving
expression created by third parties who use trademarks to
impersonate markholders.
Consumers of information often use trademarks to
identify the source of expression. Imposters may take
advantage of consumers by using marks to impersonate
markholders and falsely identify the markholder as the
author of their own expression. Trademark infringement
law should protect social network site users against
information-source confusion if the content does not dispel
that confusion for reasonable consumers. At the same time,
trademark law should be interpreted narrowly to protect
free speech interests when third parties use the marks of
others in noncommercial expression, and not in connection
with the advertising or sale of goods or services.
Many firms understandably want to control their brand
image, but the First Amendment requires them to tolerate
some expression by others that incorporates their marks.
Filing lawsuits may deter future trademark violations, but
it could harm the reputation of the markholder if people
think the third party is just poking fun at the markholder or
is otherwise engaging in expression protected by the First
Amendment. Litigious markholders may risk creating a
“Streisand effect,” which is “an increasingly common
backlash that occurs when someone tries to muzzle
information on the Web.”247 Named after Barbara Streisand
and the response to her efforts to stop the dissemination of
information about her in 2003, the Streisand effect “infects
the online community in a pandemic of free-speech-fueled
defiance, gaining far more attention than it would have had
the [intellectual property] owners simply kept quiet.”248
Rather than file a lawsuit or complain to the social network
247. Andy Greenberg, The Streisand Effect, FORBES.COM, May 11, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/05/10/streisand-digg-web-tech-cx_ag_0511streisand.
html.
248. Id.
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site, markholders should consider tolerating certain
unauthorized uses of their marks if the expression is not
causing any significant confusion. Markholders may even
benefit from social network site pages created for their
brands by third parties in this age of user-generated content
and word-of-mouth advertising.
CONCLUSION
Courts and social network sites should attempt to
balance free speech and trademark interests in
infringement disputes involving the unauthorized use of
marks in expression on these sites. They may conclude that
infringement law simply does not apply where the accused
infringer is not advertising or selling any goods or services,
the expression is noncommercial, and/or there is no use of
the mark to designate the source of expression. Such a
categorical approach will protect freedom of expression by
allowing certain unauthorized uses of marks in parody,
satire, criticism, comparative advertising, news reporting,
and other commentary on the social network site.
Yet a case-by-case analysis of the facts of the trademark
dispute may be more fair and just when third parties are
using marks to impersonate markholders and cause
confusion regarding the source of expression on social
network sites. False statements of identity and authorship
can increase consumer search costs and encourage
consumers to rely to their detriment on false or misleading
information. Banning third party use of marks to
impersonate markholders will not violate the First
Amendment if reasonable persons believe the imposter’s
false statements of identity and authorship after reviewing
the content of the social network site page. Trademark
infringement law should apply to impersonation of
markholders in such circumstances, but it may harm the
free flow of information and ideas if it is used outside this
context to ban unauthorized uses of marks in
noncommercial expression.

